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Draft Recommendation
on the eastern dimension of European security
The fusembly,
(t) Concemed that aknost seven years after the end of East-West confrontation, there rs still no agrcement
on an outhne for creatrrg a comprehensive order of peace. justice and secun[,for Europe as a r,vhole:
(t, Underhmng, therefore, horv rmportant it is for the OSCE summrt n Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996
to succeed in makrng consrderable progress tou,ards developrrg a pan-European sccunty model for the
2lst century,,
6u) Convrnced, how'ever, that such a secunty order can only' bc achreved rf outdated thinkrng rr terms of
spheres ofinfluence is replaced once and for all by a concept ofcoopcratrve secun$ grvurg every countrl'the
freedom tolorn the rntemational lnstrtutions and defence allianccs of its chorce,
(t, Senously worried by the conturuurg unstable pohtrcal situation in the Russian Federatron,
(v) Deplonng that the East-West secunty' debate rs almost u'holl1' domrnated by the question of NATO
enlargement, in uluch persrstrng fundamental drfferences betu'een NATO and Russra are not onlv preventrng
any substantial progress from berrg made but are also makrng it drfficult to reach agreement on the defirutron
of Russia's role rn the Euro-Atlantrc secunty framervork.
(v, Senousll' concemed b1'the fact that the Russian State Duma has strll not ratrfied the Start II Treatl,
and the Open Skres Treatv and that Russia is senousll, considenng linkurg NATO enlargcment urth requests
for flrndamental changes in the CFE Treaty provrsions;
(wr) Strongly' regrettrrg that NATO has been far too hesrtant about presenturg a concept on "\\'ho" and
"when" rr relation to its plamed enlargement, and maintaimng that the reasons it has grven in ansrver to "\r'hy"
wrll not be conmcmg until the new nature of secunq, nsks and the future politrcal and mrlrtary role of the
Alliance rn the new secuntv enr,rronment have been clearly defined;
(uur) Regretturg that, even though it is lughly desirable, it is unlikely that the central European countnes urll
be admitted to the European Uruon rn the rnmedrate future
(a) because admission depends to some extent on the uncertarn outcome of the intemal reforms
of the European Union rvhich are to be agreed in the intergovernmental conference on the
revision of the Maastricht Treatl', and
(b) because the European Uruon has made enlargement dependent on so man), condrtrons that
the1, cannot be met by the applicant countrres rvithin a relatively short period;
(ti Fearmg that this process rrught be subject to further delays on account of drffenng \lcws on the kind of
congruence there should be between NATO, WEU and the European Uruon ur relation to enlargement and the
prionties to be set for its time-framc:
(x) Comnced that WEU has far more than only a complementary role to play ur stabilising the eastem
drmension of European secunty;
(x, Warmll,welcomrng the decision of the WEU Corurcil to admrt Sloverua as the tenth associate parbrer
country of WEU;
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(xii) Regretting however, the absence of any specific effort by WEU to draw up a concept for enhancrng the
status of the associate parmer countnes.
(xin) Disappornted that WEU's plarmed cooperation wrth the Russian Federatron in the specrfic areas
proposed by the Assemblv has so far not been taken any further,
(nv) Impressed b1' [Ikrarne's strong political resolve to be integrated rn European structures and by rts
readiness to urtensifl' cooperatron lvrth WEU with the arm of becomurg an associate partrer;
(xv) Underlining the unportance for European secunt-v of the peaceful settlement of all remaining
controversial drfferences between Ukraure and the Russian Federatton, and of the establishment of frrendly,
stable relations betrveen the trvo countnes;
(m) Regretturg that many European and Amencan politicrans are neglectrng developments in Belarus and
are not palmg enough attention to the antidemocratic and autocratrc tendenctes wrthrn the country's present
reglme or to the rmportance of its urdependence and the need to mamtaut a permanent dralogue wrth it;
(xvr) Recalhng the mportance of the future tasks WEU is to carry out pursuant to the decrsion taken b1'the
North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996,
(rviry' Stressing the rmportance of grantrng the associate member and associate parbxer countnes the
possibilrty of full particrpatron in an)' operatrons conducted on the basis of the CJTF concept and under the
politrcal control of WEU,
(xix) Convrnced. therefore, that the enlargement concept established b1' WEU member countnes ur the
framework of the Maastncht Treatr needs to be amended by adoptrng a more flexible approach which
abandons stnct application of the principle that full WEU memberslup should be condrtronal on full
memberstup of NATO and the European Uruon;
(n) Recalhng ur thrs connection paragraph 4 of Assembly Recommendatron 589:
(xx) Pourturg to the rmportance of Turkey's position as a maJor factor for stabihsurg NATO's south*astem
reglon, partrcularly with regard to the various troublespots and conflrcts rn the Caucasus and other adjacent
regions;
(wn) Strongly advocatrng tlnt Denmark should decide tlut it x'rshes to accede to the modrfied Brussels
Treat1,,
(wnt) Emphasrsmg how rmportant t rs to strengthen the role of the Nordic Councrl as a factor for stabilising
the northrastern reglon of Europe,
RECOMMENDS THAT TFIE COUNCIL
1. Take advantage of the OSCE sumnut, beanng rr mind fis limited po\\,ers. to elaborate a colnmon
concept of the 28 WEU countnes on WEU's contnbutron for enhancrng secunt)'and stabiltt-v rn central and
eastem Europe.
2 Estabhsh, rr the framework of such a contnbution, a corrrmon position on the issue of deployrng
nuclear \\eapons rn central and eastem European countnes,
3 . Make arrangements with NATO allou,ing all associate countnes of WEU to participate fully rn actions
rmplementng the CJTF concept under the political control of WEU;
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4. Preparc a flexrble approach to its enlargement policy, makurg pronsron for
(a) an invitation to all European member countries of NATO which so rvrsh to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty;
(b) the possrbilitv of upgrading the status of assocrate partner countries to that of assocrate
member countries provided that the interested European states settle any bilateral problems
thel' may have rvith neighbouring countries;
5 Leave no doubt that all ten WEU associate parmer countnes should be considered as potential
candrdates for accessron to NATO;
6 Urgc the European Union not to slow down the process of its enlargement to central Europe and to
conttnue to consult all nations affected erther drrectly or rndrrectly by any future enlargement of the European
Uruon;
7 Urge all member countries of the European Uruon u'hrch have not yet ratified the cooperatlon treaty
urth (Jkrarne to cxpedrte the ratification process;
8. Intcnsrfi'the political dralogue uith Ukraine and give it a constructive answer to rts request to cooperate
more closelv uth Westem European Uruon;
9. Intensrfl' the dralogue, and rndeed cooperation, vrith the Russnn Federation, seeking in any event to
ehmmatc anv mrsunderstanding and speculatron as regards the enlargement ofWEU,
10. Makc it clear. however, to the Russian authorities that early ratification of the StartII Treaty and the
Opcn Skres Treaty urll facrhbte more intensrve cooperation betu'een WEU and Russia in all areas of mutual
intcrest.
I I Marntarn a permanent political dralogue wrth Belarus and Moldova.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Antretter, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I A first rvorkrng paper of the present report
\\'as drscussed at a meetmg of the Polrtrcal
Comnuttee on I Apnl 1996 u'hrch 1'our Rapporteur
n'as unable to attend for reasons beyond lus control
He is grateful for the vanous comments and
suggestlons Commrttee members made dunng that
meetmg The Commrttee subsequentlv decided to
postpone the presentation of the report untrl after the
presidential electrons m Russra, wtuch took place on
4 Julv 1996
2 Tlne clcar nctory of Bons Yeltsin over lus
rrrun nval, thc commurust lcader Gennadr
Zyuganov, has not horvever stabrhsed the pohtrcal
srtuatron wrthm the Russnn Federatron On the
contrary', the detenoratron rn the state of health of
the Russran Presrdent, xho was facrng a heart
operation, led to an mtemal po\r€r strugglc utuch
culrmnated in the mrddle of October 1996 in the
drsmrssal b1, Bons Yeltsrn of the head of the
Natlonal Secun[' Councrl. Alexander Lebed.
consrdcrcd b1' manl' peoplc as a hero becausc he
managed to put an end to the Chechnya conflict
The real reasons for hrs drsm-rssal are not whollv
clear. but the Murister of thc Intenor, for mstancc,
accused General Lebed of tnmg to seize porver m
Russia b1'forcc
3 Whereas the polrtrcal srtuation rn Russia
continues to grve senous cause for concem and
nobody'can predrct horv rt urll develop, a number of
other events have to be taken into account u'hen
assessrng the castem drmensron of European
securitv One of them rs the outcome of the meeturg
of thc North Atlantrc Councrl on 3 June 1996 in
Berhn. ri'hrch took the rmportant decision to
estabhsh the European secun['and defence identrh,
srthm NATO and grve WEU a decisive role rn
rmplementing the CJTF concept, Even more
mportant is the possrbrh[' the Berhn decisrons
opened up for the partrcrpatron of countnes that are
not members of NATO ur mrssions camed out m
the framovork of the CJTF. and thus possibll, undcr
the polrtrcal control ofWEU.
4. The Bcrhn decisions u'ere made possrble b;-
France's decisron to retum to NATO's rntegrated
structures on condrtron that the estabhshment of the
European secunty and defence rdentrtv urthrn the
Alliancc docs rn fact lead to Europe having a greater
say rn the transatlantic parftrcrs]up.
5. The thrrd factor uhrch must be taken urto
account rs thc development of the urtergovemmental
conference on the revisron of the Maastncht Treah',
ur u'hrch the crcation of a real corrrmon forergn and
secunty polio' (CFSP) for Europc and future
relations betrveen the European Uruon and WEU
conturue to be the most drfficult problems. The
reluctance of the "neutral" countnes belonging to the
European Uruon to participate m a common
defence. and the assocnte membershrp of WEU of
three NATO countries tlnt are not members of the
European Uruon make it unrealistrc ln the
foreseeable future to en!.lsage any plans for early
rntegratron betrveen WEU and the European Uruon
Furthermore, the decisions taken by NATO rn
June 1996 make rt rmpossible to entertarn anv rdea
of grung the European Uruon, uluch has four
neutral or non-aligned member countnes, authonty
to rssuc general politrcal gurdelrres to Westem
Europcan Uruon An1' krnd of subordmation of
WEU to the European Union is rnconceivable as
long as WEU remarns a treatl-based orgarusatron.
6. Horvever the FrancoCerrnan rdea of creatrng
a sort of flcxrbiliq' clause should be carefully
examined b1'the WEU Councrl WEU should take
advantage of such a clause to becomc the European
foremnner m secun['and defence matters. wrthout
rvartmg for the agreement of the four hesrtant
"neutral" countries. at the same trme allorung all the
European member countries of the Alhance to
partrcipate fulh' rn WEU's actiutres and givrng all
central European countnes lrrshrng to coopcrate
morc closelv mth the Orgarusation an upgraded
associate status.
7 There is uncertarrtl as to uhat concrete
results urll be achreved b1' the mtergovemmental
conference rn reformrng the second pillar of the
European Unron and also as to how, and
accordmg to what timetable, the Atlantic
Alliance rvrll achreve (a) its polttrcal reform and
structural reorganisatron. (b) rmplementation of
the CJTF concept rn conyunctron u'rth WEU, and
DOCLMENT I5.T2
(c) its enlNgement concept, and tlus will have
important consequences for the questlon of how and
when a comprehensrve secunty arclutecture for
Europe as a whole can be estabhshed. Ttus question
is of major urterest to all the central European
countnes u'hich are pressurg for admrssion at the
earliest possible opportunitl' to the European and
transatlantic secunty structures.
8. It is also a major concem for Ukraure and
may'rvell have an influence on the future policy of
the Russran Federation although many observers
say that domestrc developments ur Russia are
subject to their own exclusive rules In tlus context
one should not forget rvhat is happerung rr Belarus,
to ufuch the West does not pay enough attention,
because too many politicians are convinced that this
country has onll' one objective: reintegratron with
the Russian Federatron. But the West does not know
enough about the domestic srtuation in Belarus and
many people equate Presrdent Lukashenko's
drctatonal policy with the pohtical will of the rest of
the country, underestrnaturg the existence of strong
polrtrcal opposition to the President. In any event,
European politicrans should not forget Belarus and
should maintarn a permanent dralogue w'ith all the
various political forces rr the country.
9 Finally, two further factors u.ill plav an
rmportant role rn the establishment of the secunty
archrtecture referred to above: the first wrll be the
future status of Turkey urth regard to WEU and the
European Uruon 
- 
and tlus also applies (although to
a lesser extent) to Norwal' and Iccland. Secondh,,
the arrangements for bnngrng the successor slates
of former Yugoslavia and of Albania into tlus
architecture, once the conflrct has finally been
settled, have to be u'orked out
II. The unresolved problem of creating a
compreh ensive pan-European security model
10. Nothing can better demonstrate the
unresolved fundamental secunty problems facrrg
Europe as a whole than the ongourg drscussion ur
the framework of the OSCE on developng a
common and comprehensive security model for
Europe for the 2lstcentury. Work on tlus project,
based irutialh'on a Russian proposal, will be one of
the main sublccts on the agenda of the ne$ OSCE
summit wluch is to take place rn Lrsbon on
2 arrd3 December 1996
I l. In fact, almost seven years after the end of
the period of East-West confrontation, it has not
been possible to agree even the outlure of a
comprehensive order of peace, justice and secuntl'
rr Europe rn whrch cach courtry could feel
genurnely secure. In r,rerv of the complexrty of the
problem and the drvergent rnterests urvolved, rt is
doubtful whether any final results will be aclueved
at the OSCE summrt refened to. Houever, the
OSCE seems to be an appropnate framework for
developrng such a comprehensive secunty model,
embracrng as it does all the countries of Europe,
North America and central Asia.
12. Nevertheless, appropriate solutrons cannot be
found exclusively in the forum of the OSCE given
tlnt ts tasks are limited, ttnt rt rs not based on
mtemaflonal treaties and executive means and that
its powers are farrly r,r'eak. It is not possrble to
conceive of a comprehensrve security arclutectrre
for Europe without defirung the respective functions
and roles the Atlantic Alhance (urth NATO as rts
political and military instrument), WEU and the
European Union should assume wrthin that
architecture, and without reachrng agreement on the
condrtions under wluch rnterested countries can
establish their relationslups uith these orgarusations.
13. Nerther is it nght that the OSCE should be
given the task of defining the relevant
responsibilities of NATO, WEU and the European
Union, or that there should be any sort of
subordination of these orgarusations to the OSCE.
All the orgamsatrons referred to, urcludrng the
OSCE, should make complementary contnbutions
urth a uew to achielrng a corrrmon and
comprehensive secunty order for Europe.
14. However, when leadrng pohticians spell out
the advantages of regardrng all relevant European
and transatlantic security organisatrons as
interlockrng and mutually reurforcrrg instrtufions,
what rs effectrvelv lackrng is harmonisatron and
coordinatron of ttreir work and planmng processes.
For msLance, as regards the problem of enlargement
- 
one of the subjects of greatest controversl'
betwe€n NATO and Russia 
- 
no overall concept of
horv to approach it has been developed betu'een
NATO, WEU and the European Union. On the
contrarl', the idea of the three organisations
proceeding rn parallel rvithout specrffing the
criteria for so dorng has led to a vicrous circle,
which threatens to block any further progress in
the foreseeable future.
DOCLIN4ENT I5+2
III. The disadvantages of limiting the security
debate to the prohlem of NATO enlargement
15. In September 1995 NATO pubhshed a
studl' on rts enlargcmcnt rvhrch examined
primanll' the questron of "rvhy' and how" to
enlarge but drd not ansll'er the questron of "rvho
and u'hen". The European Union, on the other
hand. faces the challenge of first seekrng
agreement among all rts member countnes on the
comprchensrve instrtutronal reforms to be
drscussed rn thc intergovernmental conference on
the revrov of thc Maastricht Trcatv before being
able to settlc the questron of enlargement.
16. According to thc NATO studl'.
"enlargement of NATO is a parallel process wrth
and u'ill complement that of the European
Unron". At thc same trme the studl' emphasises
that "the tu'o organisations rvrll proceed
autonomously accordmg to therr respectrve
tnternal dwamics and processes" The
cnlargement of both organrsations should be
mutually' supportlve and "u'hlle no rigid
parallehsm is foreseen. each organisation rvrll
need to consrder devclopmcnts in the other".
17. As far as Western European Unron rs
concemed. the problem of rts enlargement is
closely' hnked u'rth the results of the
rntergol'crnmental confercncc u'hrch has to dcfinc
its future role and the character of the
relatronshrp and cooperation betrveen WEU and
the European Union. NATO. on the other hand.
has set out ver)' clearlv in its study, on
enlargement hou' it urshes WEU to tackle the
question of enlargement
"All full members of WEU are also
members of NATO. Because of the
cumulatrve effect of the securitv
safeguards of Article V of the modified
Brussels Treatl' and of Artrclc 5 of the
Washrngton Trcatr'. the marntenance of
thrs linkage is essential Both enlargcment
processes should, therefore, be compatible
and mutually supportrve. At the same
trme, WEU rs bcing developed as the
defence componcnt ofthe European Unron.
u'hich strengthens thc rclatronshrp betu,een
the trvo organisatrons. An eventual broad
congruence of European membershrp m
NATO, the European Unron and WEU
u,ould have positir,'e effects on European
secunt\'"
l8 Hou'ever. beanng in mind the specrfic
character ofthe thrcc organisations, the desrre to
cstablish broad congruence in therr cnlargement
procedures has so far srmplv slorved doun the
process as a x'hole Addrtronal factors are
contnbutmg to a srtuation that ls agaln
consrgnrng the central European countries to an
antc-chamber.
19. It is true that. at the mmrsterral meeting of
the North Atlantic Councrl rn Berhn on
3 June 1996. mrnrsters reaffirmed their
commitment to open the Alhance to ne\\'
members But no specific decisrons were taken
20. On that occasion. the North Atlantrc
Council again rcaffrrmed rts
"determrnatron that the process of opening
the Alhance to nerv members should not
create drvrdrng lines in Europe or rsolate
any countn' Our goal remalns cler-closer
and deeper cooperative ties rvith all NACC
and PfP Partners u'ho rvrsh to build such
relatrons u'rth us. The enlargement of the
Alhance is consistent with a rvidcr proccss
of cooperation and mtegration alreadl'
under waf in today''s Europe invoh'rng the
EU and WEU as u'cll as the OSCE. the
Councrl of Europe and other European
instrtutrons Our strategl, rs to help burld a
broad European security architecturc
based on true cooperation throughout the
u'holc of Europe "
Zl. Hou'eler. after lrsitng Moscow ur September
1996. Chancellor Kohl told Parhament that
agreement had been reached rvith the French and
the Unrted States Presrdents as rvell as rvith the
Brrtrsh Prrme Minister to postpone the debate on
NATO enlargement until spring 19971
According to other press reports2, a first decisron
rs to bc taken at a NATO summit meetrng which
might be held in earl1, summer 1997. This
mformatron u'as confirmed by NATO offrcials
durrng thc Polrtical Committee's visit to NATO
headquartcrs on l6 October 1996.
22. But even through NATO offrciall.v denicd
the existence of a list of countries that might be
admrtted to NATO in a first wave, tt has become
I Frankfurter Allgemetne Zetlung,
t996.
2 Dte trtr'elt.2'7 September 1996
12 September
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clear that there is a tendenq' in the Unrted States
Congrcss to name specific countrres such as
Poland. thc Czech Repubhc and Hungary, as
being among those that urll be rncludcd rn thc
first s'ave of NATO enlargcment
23 Accordrng to other sourcos of rnformationl
a group of five countnes has becn identrfied
consisting of Poland. thc Czech Repubhc,
Hungary'. Slovenia and Romania. lvhereas
Slovakra is not includcd The questron of horv to
proceed urth enlargement. on a case-bv-case
basis. choosrng scvcral groups of statcs in
drffcrent \\'aves or admrttmg all the relsvant
candidates together at the same time. is a
fundamental rssue q'hrch has to be settled not
only by' NATO but also b1' WEU and the
European Union. All three organrsatrons also
have to soh,e the problem of u'hat kind of
relationshrp they rntend to estabhsh rvrth thosc
countrres that rvill not be invrted to.lorn
24 Hou'ever. one has the strong rmpresslon
that the present discussion is totalll' domrnatcd
bv NATO. The effect of thrs rs that the u'hole
secuntv debate rs bcrng reduced to a
controverslal dralogue bctrveen NATO and
Russra. ruth 'i'cn' little chance of differences
berng settled Durrng hrs vrsit to Moscou', vour
Rapporteur had an opportunrtv to detect strong
mlstrust of NATO on the part of almost all his
mterlocutors. the onlv exception being
Mr Stepashrn. secuntv counsellor to Mr Chemo-
mlrdrn the Pnme Mrruster. u'ho said that NATO
cnlargcmcnt u'as not one of the marn rssues in the
prcsrdcntral electron campalgn. The American
proposal of a secunt)' charter betrveen the
Atlantic Alliance and Russra has been given a
cool reccption b1' the Russian authorrtres
Accordrng to the Russian approach. the first step
should consist of substantial NATO adaptatron
As the next step, NATO and Russra should
conclude a legally brnding agreement on therr
relatrons and only as thc thrrd step should the
question of enlargemcnt bc discussed.
Converselr'. according to the NATO concept.
enlargcment comcs first accomparued. rn a
second phase, bv a procedure to enhance the PfP
process. leavrng thc qucstron of NATO-Russran
relatrons to be settled as the third step.
3. Dte U'elt. 25 September 1996.
Ilerald Tnbune.2l October 1996.
25 At thc moment it is drffrcult to see ho$'
these drfferent approaches could be harmonrsed
Indced. the Russian positron seems to hal'c
hardened grven that the Russran State Duma strll
refuses to ratif,'the Start II Treatl' desprte efforts
made b1' the Russian and Amencan defence
ministers to persuade it to do so Somc mcmbers
of the State Duma link the rssuc u'ith thc problem
of NATO's cnlargemcnt. n'hilc othcrs argue that
the efforts berng madc b1' Rcpublicans m the
Unrted States Congrcss to build a natronal
mrssrle defence svstem riould undermrne the antr-
balhstic mrssrlc Trcatl' (ABM) concluded in
1972 bctu'ccn the Unrtcd Statcs and the then
Soviet Unronu
26. Another concern for a number of Russia's
neighbours are the concesslons made to the
Russran Federatron accordmg to the final
document of the Confcrence revieuing the CFE
Trcatv u'hich took place from l5 to 3I
May'1996 m Vienna. A ma.;or problcm u'as
created by Russia making a request to scalc
doun rts mrlitary commltments to reduce troops
numbers rn rts flank rcglons. Russra askcd to be
allorved to deploy morc troops on its southern
flank than are permrttcd by thc Treatf in relatron
to the l'anous conflrcts in thc Caucasus and m
particular in Chechnva Furthcrmorc. it asked for
the regrons of Pskou' and St Petersburg to be
exempt from thc northcrn flank regulatrons.
These regions bordcr drrcctlv on Estonia, Latvia
and Frnland
27. Inrtrallr'. thc North Atlantic Council had
strcsscd very clearlv at rts meetrng on
5 Dccember 1995 "that compliance u'ith legallv
binding obligatrons rs a necessan' foundatron for
good ovcrall relations... We u'elcome the
17 November 1995 decision bv the Joint
Consultatrve Group, in whrch the 30 CFE statcs
reconfirm therr commrtrnent to thc Trcaty and agree
to find a cooperative solutron to thc flank problem
In thrs conterl, u'e spccrally urgc all States Partres
sho have failed to comply ruth thcrr obhgatrons, to
mtensrfi'therr efforts to reach as quickll, as possible
such a coopcratrve soluilon acccptablc to all".
28. Honever, at thc Vrcnna Conference a
concesslon u'as madc to the Russran Federation by'
givrng rt untrl Mav 1999 to fulfil rts obligations
regardrng armaments hmrts rn the regions of
Internahonal
1 Internahonal Herald Tnbune. 16 October 1996
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St. Petersburg and the north Caucasus. The parmers
conceded furthermore that the relevant flank areas,
ur wluch Russia has to reduce lts troop numbers.
urll be scaled dorm rn geographrc terms These
concessions have given nse to rnaJor conccm rn the
Baltrc countnes as rn,ell as m the southem region. If
the West's concessions ll'ere rntended to soften
Russia's opposrtion to NATO enlargement, they
apparentll' farled to do so.
29 Dunng hrs rasrt to LaMa ur September 1996,
1'our Rapporteur u,as told by the Latr,ran Defence
Mrruster that Russia's mrlitary potentnl near the
LaMan border had been considerably reinforced as
a consequence of the CFE relrew conference.
Paratroop uruts, tank units with T-80 tanls and
"frontrer protectron troops" some 80 000 strong
rvere deplot,ed near the LaMan border Accordrng
to LaMan mformatron, Russia had also deploy'ed
border troops ur Belarus and had reached an
agreement wrth Belarus onJomt border protection.
IV Giving immediate priority
to identifying the main problems affeaing
the eastern dimension of European security
30. The new settlement of the southem Russian
flank problem has to be seen in a broader
frameu'ork rr uhrch strong economrc rnterests,
partrcularll' rcgardrng the exploitation of Caspian
petroleum and natural gas u'here several countries
are urvolved. have to be taken mto account. One of
the ma.;or play'ers in thrs context is Turkev: a
NATO member country and a WEU assocrate
member country situated on Europe's south eastem
flank. The other is lran
31. Your Rapporteur went on an rrutial usit to
Turkey on the first of a number of nsits he made to
vanous central and eastem European countnes to
gather urformation for tlus report. In r,rew of that
country's geograpluc posrtron, bounded by regions
engaged rn conflrct ur the Caucasus, the Balkans
and the Middle East, its econorruc and geopolitrcal
mterests rn the Caucasus, and its polrtrcally close
relations wrth the Turkrsh-speakrng countnes on the
southem flank of the Russian Federation, Turkey's
position is strll a key one rn European securitv
terms. Its uews and positions wrth respect to the
issues remarmng to be resolved in order to create a
corrrmon and comprehensive securitv model for
Europe cannot therefore be ignored and may have
rmportant consequences for the attrtude member
countnes of the European Uruon and WEU should
adopt as regards its future role and place ur
European secunty structures
32. Another unportant factor for European
secunty is Nonvay,. Nonvay', hke Turkey', ls a
NATO member and WEU assocrate member The
Russian Ground Troops Commander, Madimrr
Seml'onourov. seemed to be spealong an entrrely'
nerv language uhen he stated at the end of February
that NATO exerclses under u'ay rn Norway \\'ere a
threat to Russran natronal security and that Russnn
forces uould bc put on alert to morutor them.
33 On a numbcr of othcr outstandrng matters the
Russnn Federatron's attrtude wrll be decrsle in
paung the u'av for cnhancrrg pcace and secuntv ur
central and eastem Europe. One rs compliance urth
the conditron, rmposed by the Parliamentarl'
Assembly, of the Councrl of Europe for Russia's
entry rnto that orgamsation, that Russn should
ratifu the agreement wrth Moldova on the
uithdrawal of the Russran l4th Army and rts
equrpment from Moldovian temtory wrthm sx
months of its accessron to the Councrl of Europe.
The other is the request that the Russmn concept of
the "near abroad" should no longer be used to
suggest that certarn of Russia's neighbours fall
nrthrn a specral Russian sphere of rnfluence.
34. These rssues have practical consequences
first and foremost for future Russian relations uith
the Baltic states. urth trvo of which there are still a
number of temtonal and other bilateral questions
outstandrng, and as regards Lrthuama and Poland ur
relatron to the futurc status of the drstrict of
Kalimngrad. The strong Russnn mrlitary presence
rn tlus enclave and the problem of Russian mrlitary'
transit through Lrthuaruan temtory are pemunent
concerrs for Lithuarua and Poland even though
these countnes avoid pubhc discussron ofthe nsues.
35. A further crucial element in terms of future
European secuntv will be the development of
relations behveen the Uruted States and Russn. It rs
uell known that both superpowers were often
tempted rr the past to negoflate agreements and
arrangements on matters relatrng to European
secunt,'over the heads ofthe European countries,
but there are also bilateral issues between the tlvo
countnes u'tuch have rmportant consequences for
Europe, such as the future applicatron of the ABM
Treat_l' u'tuch has been called into question on




36. Converselv, the arrangements arnved at
for Russian participation, within the Bosruan
Unrted States sector, in implementing the Dalton
peace accords on the conflrct rn the Balkans arc
regarded bv man,v politicrans as a possible model
for future cooperation betlvccn NATO and
Russia in Europe.
37. There are a number of additional
important factors affecting the eastern dimension
of European securrtv u'hrch should be carefully
studred before the questron of enlargement is
taken any' further Among them, the follovving are
topical rssucs
(a) developments m Russia and its place
and role m a pan-European securitv
architecture. in particular rts future
relations u'ith NATO. WEU and the
European Union:
(b) the future development of the
Commonrvealth of Independent States(CIS) and its various membcr
countrres, paying special attention to
Ukrame;
@ the various conflrcts in thc Caucasus
and other areas of the territorv of the
former Soviet Unron:
(d) possrble consequences for European
securrty of conflicting interests
betrvccn Turker'. Russra and Iran but
also betr+cen lvestern countnes such
as the United States and the United
Kingdom regarding the exploitation
ofCaspian petroleum and natural gas
resources;
(e) possrble consequences for European
secunty of conflictrng Turkrsh-
Russran interests as regards therr
rmpact on countries on Russra's
southern flank that are under Turkrsh
influence,
(f) current problems regardrng the
implementation of East-West
disarmament and the control of
armaments agrcements.
In thrs connectron one maJor achievement has
becn thc transfcr of nuclear warheads from
Belarus and Lkrarne to Russian territory and it is
crucral that thel' should no\\' be destroyed.
Hou'ever, rt is still not knoun rvhen the Opcn
Skres Trcatl, rvill enter rnto force and rvhen thc
Russran State Duma u'ill ratifr' the Start II
Treatl'.





of problems that may affcct thc
eastern drmension of Europcan secunty. rt should
not be forgotten that a numbcr of brlateral
differences still exrst betrveen some central
European countnes and are as yet not fully'
resolved Aftcr long-standrng drfferences,
Hungary and Romanra have managed to sign a
bilatcral treaty' setthng the arrangements
governing thcir rclations and in particular the
rrghts of strong Hungarian minoritres. rvithout
giving thcm collectrve autonomr'. It is to be
hopcd that this treatl' urll u'ork better than the
trcaty concluded earher betlveen Hungan' and
Slovakra undcr the auspices of thc Conferencc on
the European Stability Pact About 600 000
ethnrc Hungarians are living rn Slovakia and
rvant collective ethnrc autonomy, u,hrch Slovakra
is not readl'to grant. But the Hunganan mrnoritv
also accuses the Slovak authoritres of passrng
legrslatron restrrctmg therr mmonty rrghts
39. The question of thc status of Moldova has
not vet been definrtivcll' scttlcd, and there are strll
problems betx'een Turkel' and Bulgarla over
mrnorrtv rssues. Conr,'erselr'. there is considerable
reason to hopc that anv remaining drfferences
betu'een Italv and Slovcnra arc rn the process of
being settled. Your Rapporteur \\'as particularh,
pleased to visrt thc governmental and
parliamentan' authorrties of Slovenia on the very'
da1' rvhen Sloverua u,as granted the status of the
tenth WEU assocrate partner country Hc rvas
rmpressed by the Slovene authoritres' detcr-
mrnatron and wrlhngness to be fullv rntegrated rn
all the rvestern securitv structures. It is also to be
hoped that the planned loint declaratron b1' the
Federal Republic of Germanl' and the Czech
Repubhc on the pnnciplcs of thcrr future
bilateral relatrons rvrll finally be agrced b.v the
two countnes
1. The importance of future developments
in the Russian Federation and
the Commonweolth of Independent States
40. Even rf rt rs rarelv stated clearly in public,
it is obvious that the prrncrpal reason u'hy the
central Europcan countnes are so keen to jorn
l1
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\\'estern secunty structures. and first and
foremost those of NATO. rs therr fear that they
might once again fall prev to Russran domrnation
or to its sphere of influence and mrght risk
loosing the freedom and rndependencc they'
gained as a result of the break-up of the Sovret
cmpire Even though the United Natrons Chartcr
and the December 1995 OSCE summit confirm
the nght of even' countn, to choose freell'
u'hethcr or not to.loin a defence alliance. Russra's
strong opposrtion to an1' NATO enlargement is
an important factor in the rvestern decrsron-
makrng proccss, rn spite of rvestern politicians
affirmrng over and ovcr again that no countn'
can veto any decrsron taken by NATO to admit
neu' member states. But so far rt has not been
possrble to provrde convincrng n'estern ans\\-ers
to the Russran argumcnts that NATO's
enlargement is not ncccssar)' because, urth the
end of the East-West conflrct. any' threat has
disappeared. Converselr', the Russran srde has
never been able to comc up uith a vahd
argument agamst the West's assertlon that
NATO rs a purelr. defensrve alhance and that
enlargement does not constrtute a thrcat to
Russra
4l Hou.evcr, the marn Russran argumcnt for
replacrng a defence alliance in Europe by a pan-
Europcan collcctrve securitv system. possibll'
under the auspices of a reinforced OSCE, has
recentlv bccn greatlv undermined b1' Russia's
o\\r behavrour Thc grorving mfluence of
polrtrcal forccs rn thc countrl' that u'ish to reunite
the former components of the Sovret Uruon m
one \\'a)' or another has become evrdent,
partrcularly rn thc results of thc December 1995
State Duma elections The appomtment of
Mr Prrmakov as the mrnrster for forcrgn affarrs
\\'as seen b1' many observers as a further
indrcation of a shrft in Russran forergn pohcl'
tou'ards regaimng rts sphere of mflucncs m rts
"lost" terrttories
42. Thc resolutron adopted on 15 March 1996
- 
thrcc months before the Russran presrdential
clcctrons 
- 
by'the Russran State Duma to annul
thc agrecment to disband the Soviet Unron,
concluded on l2 December l99l by Russia,
Lkrarne and Belarus. \\'as a strong polrtrcal
srgnal cvcn though rt has no legally' bindrng
effect Of even more importance was the public
dcclaratron bv Prcsrdcnt Ycltsm, one dav before
the aforementroncd Duma vote, affirming that
Russia and Belarus u'crc close to arrivrng at a
politrcal associatron which might lead to the
possibilitv of a confederatron between the tu'o
countries It is not difficult to rmagmc the
consequences any unification betrveen Belarus
and Russia rvill have not onlv for the securitv
situation of Poland and the Baltrc countnes but
also for Europe as a rvhole
43 If onc also takes seriousll,' the Russran
Prcsrdcnt's further statement that a reinforced
Russian partnershrp urth former Soviet central
Asran repubhcs such as Kazakhstan and
Krrghrzstan rs also under rvay. all the other
member countnes of the Commonrvealth of
Independent States in particular Ukrame.
Moldova and the Caucasian repubhcs such as
Georgra, Armerua and Azerbauan 
- 
must be
asking questions about the futurc of their
independence
44. This also applies to Bulgana, u'hrch rvas
mvrted by Presrdent Yeltsrn rn Aprrl 1996 to
partrcrpate ln the agreement on spccral
cooperation betrveen Russia. Belarus, Kazakh-
stan and Kirghizstan. During hrs vrsrt to Mos-
cow, \'our Rapporteur's mterlocutors tried to play
doun Boris Yeltsin's statement rcgardrng
Bulgaria Nevertheless. the matter led to a maJor
political cnsrs ln that country
45. Durrng hrs talks rvith members of the
Russran State Duma. ),our Rapporteur \\'as
partrcularlv rmpressed b1, the strong opposition
expressed bv members of the Defence Committee
to ratrficatron of the Start II Treatl'. Accordrng to
some of the mcmbcrs, this treatv ls depnvrng
Russia of rts entire strategic capabrlrty'. u'hile its
antr-mrssile defence capabilrty has broken doun
completell' smcc the break-up of thc Sovret
Union. At the same trme. thev say that NATO
intends to expand to the borders of Russra and
claim that the United States rs violatrng thc ABM
Treatl,. Furthermore. there u'as great mrstrust
about the United States reallv berng iulfing to
destrov rts nuclear rvarheads and general
oppositron to an American mrlitan' presencc in
Europe.
46 Rcgarding ratification of the Open Skies
Treatr'. rephes \\'ere more or less evasive. Some
members of the Defcnce Committee said that all
initratrvcs cnhancrng confidcnce should be
supported but nobodv should trv to dupe the
other partners. But the Russrans also had
economlc problems concernlng the provision of
t2
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the necessarl'arrcraft for rmplementrrg the treaty. In
the end, hou'ever, the Russrans agarr used NATO
cnlargement as an argument for calhng ratrfication
of the Open Skres Trcatl rnto questron
47. The Charrman of the Forergn Affairs
Commrttce, Mr Lukm, also cxpressed strong
opposrtron to the idca of NATO enlargement
because none ofthc ccntral European countries rvas
threatened by Russia. Thc West had been
contamrnated b1' the amre[' psvchosis of a number
ofcentral European countnes. The first response to
NATO enlargemcnt u-as the creation of a tuuon
betrveen Russia and Belarus If the malonty of
Russnns hvrng rn the eastem part of Lkrarre u'erc
to reahse that such a uruon would urcrcasc li'r,rng
standards rn Belarus- they, too would try to follou,
this course of aclon.
48 Wrth regard to possible altematives to
NATO enlargcment. Mr Lukur dcplored the fact
that Russra had no voice m most of the relcvant
mtemailonal organisatrons apart from the OSCE. a
very' big orgarusation rrcludrng many. countries
outside Europe. The Amencans u'ould never agree
to WEU plalmg a maJor role as a European
secuntl' and defence structure because thcv nere
determrned to marntarn their lcadrng posrtron r:r
Europe. Pohcy-makrng should not be domrnated b1'
an anrretv psychosis.
49. Mr Shokm. Vrce-Chairman of the State
Duma, confirmcd the strong opposition to NATO
enlargement of all factrons represented m
Parhament Hou'ever, he understood that Russra
could not veto decisions taken by NATO, and
advocated the estabhshment of a common pan-
European secunty system ur the framervork of the
OSCE. But rf NATO rvas enlarged, Russia would
have to react bv creatmg a ne\\,defence bloc, a
possrbiliry' hc &d not favour WEU should
partrcipatc much more actively rn the elaboratron of
common secunh' structures
50. According to Mr Shokrn, the decrsion of the
State Duma to annul the agreement to drsband the
Sol,ret Uruon had no effect smce such a decision fell
rnithrn the compctence of the Federatron Councrl.
Furthermore. by adopting such a resolution, the
State Duma had called itself rnto question since the
Souet Uruon had not had a State Duma. The
agreement befii'een Russia and Belarus. as uell as
specral cooperation rvrth Kazakhstan and
I(rghrzstan. maml)' concerned the creatron of a
custorns uruon and possrblv an economic and
monctan' uruon It mrght be possrblc to create a
lourt Parhamentar]' Asscmbll' rr I 998
51 Regardrng relations wth the Baltrc states. the
Vrce-Charrman of the State Duma sard relations
\\'ere nornal *rth Lrthuama but very bad rirth
Estoma because that country drscnmrnated agarnst
the Russian mrnon[' Consequentlv Russia uould
not grant Estorua the most-favoured nation clause.
Furthermore, there \\'ere problems xith the
Orthodox Church rn Estorua Thc problem of the
mrlitary transrt of Russian troops to and from
Kalirungrad tkough Lrthuaruan temtory had been
settled. But other plans for transrt through Belarus
and Poland had come to nothurg because of strong
Polish nustrust It u'as planned to declare the zone
of Kahmngrad a free-trade arca and Russra drd not
rush to pursue an1, strategic goals uith thc presencc
of Russian troops rn tlus arca. Al1 the naval uruts
had to be urthdraun from the Baltic states and therc
\\'as no altematrve other than to stailon them m the
ports of Kahmngrad.
52 Developments ln connectron urth the
Tashkent Trealv \\€re not moleng tou'ards a nc\\,
alliance but uere instead concentrated on brlateral
and multrlateral cooperatlon, maurl)' m
peacekeepurg nusslons rn the temtory of the
Commonrvealth of Independent States (CIS), and on
mrlrtary/tcchnologrcal cooperation. The Constrtutron
of the CIS dld not allou. any greater mrlrtan'
cooperatlon,
53 Dunng his talks urth various Russm
representatlves. )'our Rapportcur observed that thev
held drfferent vrews on the usefulness of
strengthening OSCE structurcs A number of them
reahsed that the proposal for the OSCE to be the
lcadrng mtematronal securih' structure is not
reahstic Some of them prarscd Russran cooperatlon
rn the peace process rn former Yugoslar,ra and
considered it sct a good precedcnt for futurs
cooperation The)' advocated a special trcatl'
betrveen NATO and Russn on thc basis of the
Washmgton Treaty but urth looser arrurgemonts.
Accordrng to these rntcrlocutors. the first task
should be to harmoruse mrlitan'doctnnes. Whcreas
the Uruted States lras prellouslv considered its most
rmportant partner. Russia's oblcctrve no\\' \\'as to
move closer to Europc.
54. Your Rapporteur u'as impressed b1, the
frankness rvith rvhich the Charrman of the
Commrttee for Internal Sccurity descrrbed the
great danger posed bv criminalitl, in Russia.
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radroactive pollutron rn the Murmansk area,
nuclear terrorrsm and the illegal proliferation of
nuclcar matcrials The need for neu' legislatron
and internatronal assrstance \\'as clearly' stresscd.
55 Whereas almost all your Rapporteur's
contacts had ma.1or reservatrons about NATO,
manv of them rrsrc mterested in rntensifiiing
contacts and coopcratron rvrth Western European
Unron and u'ere partrcularll'keen to knou more
about thc Organrsatron None of them expressed
anv rescrvations about WEU enlargemcnt but
there uas some reluctance rvhen they werc asked
rf thrs rr'as a realistrc altematil'c
56 The most impressrve statement regarding
the rmportance of the role of WEU rvas made bv
the deputy Foreign Mrnrster, Mr Afanleu'ski, rn
talks rvith 1'our Rapporteur Hc stressed ln
particular that the former Sovrct Union had
agreed to Gcrman reurufication and to the formcr
Gcrman Democratic Republic comlng under
NATO on conditron that NATO structures drd
not expand further to the east. If that happened. a
ne\\' lron curtain rvould be created near Brest
Russra could not agree to NATO having a
svstcm rn Europe rn u'hrch the Unrted States
requestcd the leadrng role w'rth Russra lcft out
altogether Accordrng to the minrster. NATO
enlargcmcnt to take rn central European countrres
\\'as unnecessan' bccause Russra did not pose a
threat to those countnes A partnershrp rvith
NATO nould onlv bc meaningful rf it led to real
consultation Such cooperatron could be achieved
much more casrlv u'rth WEU and there u'as some
drsappointmcnt m Russra that all the concrete
proposals rt had put fonrard had not been taken
up ln practrce In contrast. Russia's relations rvrth
the WEU Asscmbll' u'ere much better and the
holdrng of a parliamentan' seminar rn Moscou'
\\'as rmportant to grve the dialogue fresh rmpetus.
57 Regardrng relatrons betrveen Russra and
Lkrarne. Mr Chernomy,rdm's special advrser u'as
ven' optrmistic that the drffcrcnces outstanding
betu'een the trr'o countrres. cspccralll,u'rth regard
to the status of Scvastopol and the Black Sea
fleet. u'ould be settlcd soon
58. Your Rapporteur's uslt to Russia took
place before the prcsrdcntral elections
Nevertheless he is convinced that since hrs 
',,isrt
there has bccn no malor shrft in the directron of
Russran secuntv pohcv Thrs pohcv cannot be
descrrbed as threatenrng but, as the main
successor state of the Soviet Unron, Russia
remalns one of the mrghtiest nuclear porvers and
rs strll searchmg for its place in the European and
intematronal secuntv archrtecture The most
important danger. hou'ever, lies in the uncertam
outcome of the rntemal power strugglc taking
place rn the countn'.
2. The position of Ukraine
59 The importance of an rndependent Ukrarne
for European securrty'and the strong interest the
country has m moving much closer to u'estern
European structures have been hrghhghted b1' a
number of cvents thrs ]'ear. Frrst. the ncw
drrectron berng taken rn Ukrainran foreign pohc1,
oblectrves rvas clearly, expressed rn President
Kuchma's address to thc WEU Assembll' rn
Pans on 5 June 1996 Secondly, the WEU
Instrtute for Securrty Studres held a seminar rn
Pans on 4 and 5 July 1996 on "llkrarne and
European Security'" and, at the end of August.
the Lkrarnran Forergn Mmrster wrote a letter to
the Bclgran Charrman-in-Office of thc WEU
Minrstcrial Councrl requestrng that his country
be granted the status of an associate partner of
WEU
60. At first srght. one mrght be tempted to
consrder that the Ukrarnran Presrdent's asscrtion
before the WEU Assembll' that "full European
Unron membership rs the prioritv for us" is not rn
hne rvrth the Declaratron on the State Soverergntv
of Ukrame approved b1' rts parhament rn 1990
pnor to Ukrarnran mdependcnce, u'hrch
proclaimed that "Ukrame rvould stnve to become
a nuclear-free, non-ahgncd, and permanentlv
neutral state". Horvever. the Ukramran Presrdent
declared that.
"These pro\.,lslons of the Declaratron ll'ere
armed at creaturg pohtical and legal
foundatrons for peaccful secession from the
USS& for the intentron proclarmed rr the
Declaratron \\'as urcompatrble with the
USSR status of a nuclear power and that of
the state headrng the Warsau' Treah'. So it
\\'as pnncrpallr' rmportant that the
Declaratron determrned not the status of
l,krarne. but her mtention to obtarn rt The
mtentron rvas to bc brought into lfc b)
concrcte deeds, approval of respectrvc
normative acts. Takrng rnto account her
specral geopolrtrcal posrhon and under-
l4
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standrng her responsibrlrtl' for marntarung
secunt), and stabrlrtl' on the continent,
Lrkame has rmplementcd the urtention as far
as it concerns nuclear-free and non-aligned
stafus "
61. Thc Ukrainian President then took the
opportunrty to remind the Assembll' that the last
strategic nuclear rvarhead was brought out of
Ukrame on I June 1996. He rerterated the
proposal Belarus had also made to implement the
concept of a nuclear-free central and eastern
Europe. According to the Lkrainian Prcsident
"the establishment of such a zone betrveen the
Baltrc and thc Black Seas would promote
confidcnce and reduce the threat of havmg nerv
dividing lines on the continent".
62. Agarn according to the President,
Ukrarne's non-aligned status was not an obstacle
to it takrng part m mternational organisatrons and
cooperatmg with them. This also included
partrcrpatron m polrtrco-mrlrtarv structures and
here he referred in particular to the partrcrpatron
of Austna, Frnland and Srveden in WEU
actrvrties as observers
63. Your Rapporteur took the opportunrtl, to
visit Krev from I to 5 October 1996 m order to
have comprehensive talks urth the relevant
governmcntal and parliamentarl, authontres of
the country During hrs vrsit hc had an extremell'
interesting exchange of vrews rvith the Minrster
for Forergn Affairs, Mr Udovenko, rvhich had
not orrginallv been planned 1n the offrcral
prograrnme During thrs meeting, the mrnrster
repeated Ukraine's particular interest in the
actrvrtres of Westem European Union and rts
readiness to become an assocrate partner
64. According to the minister. it u,as more
appropriate for Ukrarne to approach rvcstern
secuntv structures vra WEU than vra NATO,
rvhich rvas still rcgardcd as a former enemy bv a
large proportron of the population It was
Ukraine's objective to become part of those
structures rvhereas in relation to Russra and thc
Commonuealth of Independent States onlv somc
types of loosc cooperatron arrangement lr,ere
envrsagcd by' Ukraine.
65 ln the aforementroned letter to the Belgran
Presrdencl', thc mrnrster had also proposed a Jomt
declaratron u'ith WEU envisagrng the follourng
specific areas of cooperatron
peacekeeping
airlift
Ukramian support in remforcrng
WEU's operatronal capabrlities
- 
partrcrpation of Ukrarnian represcn-
tatives in WEU excrciscs
- 
nominatron of liaison officers at WEU
headquarters
cooperation between the WEU Satellrte
Centre rn Torrejon and the Ukrainran
Cosmic Agency.
66 According to a commuruqud rssued b1'the
WEU Secretanat-General on 20 September
1996, the Secretary-General, Mr Cutrlerro, and
the Ukrainran Foreign Mrnister met on
19 September rn Kiev. There was no mention m
the text of Ukrame's ursh to become an assocrate
partner of WEU Horvever, the communrque
stated the follorving mter aha
"2 The vrsit of the WEU Secretan'-
General to Ukraine is yet another step in
the process of the development of relatrons
betu'een Western European Umon and
llkrame
3. The comprehensrve and open
exchange of vrews during the vrsit between
the Secretarl,-General and the Mmrster for
Forergn Affarrs testrfies to the constructivc
dialoguc betrveen WEU and Ukraine.
u'hich the trvo partres are willing to
develop further.
The Secretary-General expressed his
satrsfactron u'ith the regularitv and the
substance of the meetmgs he and the
Presidencv had had u'rth the Ambassador
of Ukraine in Brussels.
4. The Secretary-Gencral and the
Mmrster for Foreign Affarrs of Ukraine
emphasrsed the major importance for
stabrlrty and sccurrty' m Europe of Ukraine
as an rndependent, democratic, sovcreign
and economrcally strong country.
5 The Secretarl'-General also expressed
appreciatron for recent democratrc
l5
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progress achreved bl' Lkrarne. partrcularlv
thc adoptron of the countrlJs ne\\'
Constitutron b1' the Verkhovna Rada
6 The Secretan-Gencral also paid
tribute to Ukrame's pohcl' aimcd al
buildrng good-ncrghbourlv relatrons urth
all hcr neighbours
7 . The Secrctan -Gencral u'armlv
uelcomed Ltkrarne's commitmcnt to
nuclcar non-prohferatron through tts
accesslon as a non-nuclear x,capon state to
the NPT
Hc also acknoxledgcd the hrstonc
rmportance of the rrrthdrau'al of all
nuclear \\'eapons from thc ternton' of
lJlirarnc, a process u'hrch u'as completcd
on I June 1996
Thc Secretan'-Gencral u'elcomed
Ukrarne's efforts to achreve its
denuclearrsatron and thc Mrnrster for
Forcrgn Affarrs u'clcomcd thc support
gil'en bv WEU states to achreve thrs goal.
8 The Secrctan'-General cxprcssed
rccognrtron for Ukrame's practrcal
contnbutrons to European secuntl' and
stabilrtf in crisrs-managemcnt operatlons
such as IFOR and LINTAES
9 The Mmrster for Forergn Affairs of
Ukraine stressed the rmportance Ukrarne
attachcs to rts rapprochcment *'ith the
European rnstrtutrons and to thc
enhancement of rts relatrons urth trans-
atlantrc secuntv structures Thc
Secretary'-Gencral expressed apprecration
for Ukrarne's asplratlons rn thrs respect.
10. Ukrarne rs an lmportant European
partner of WEU Taking into account thc
WEU Permanent Councrl's dccision of
March 1995 and thc progress achreved
smce then. the partres agreed that thev u'ill
look for concrete \\'avs ln rvhrch a practrcal
cooperation process can be pursucd.
Sccretary'-Gcneral Cutrlcrro confirmed that
thc proposals rn Mirustcr Udovenko's letter
of 27 August to the WEU Prcsidencv
lr'ould be studied n'ithrn WEU. rn thc
context of cxlstlng arrangements, as
possrble forms of practical cooperation" in
the abovementroned arcas. but urthout
prol'rdrng definrtrve rcphes.
67 Your Rapporteur also had an opportunrtv
to hold detarled discussions srth the varlous
authorrtrcs and especrallv rvith Mr Horbuhn-
Sccretary of the National Secuntl, Councrl of
Ukrarne On 18 September 1996 Mr Horbuhn
had grvcn an intcrcstrng specch to thc Unrted
States Congrcss ln rvhrch he addresscd some
important outstandrng lssues regardrng Ukrainc's
specrfic sltuatron. rihich u'ere also at the centrc
of dtscusstons vour Rapporteur had u'rth hrs
Ukrarruan contacts He told Congrcss that "thc
exlstence of polrtrcal forces. mamlv of the
extreme lcft. should also be noted as one of
Ilkrarne's rcalrtrcs Such factions tr1' to usc the
comphcatcd economic srtuation. and drsplal'
rnterest rn the farlurc of rcforms. rn ordcr to
restorc the former USSR. rvrth its rntegrated
politrcal and economlc svstems and forergn
polrtrcal orrentatron"
68 Mr Horbuhn also stressed that Ukrame
"n'as the first nuclear po\\,er to voluntarilv grve
up its nuclear arscnal. the thrrd largest m the
u'orld". He also recalled Lkrarne's proposals "to
estabhsh a nuclear-free zone as u'ell as a zone of
peace and stabrirtv rn central and eastern Europe
and to u'ork out confidencc-burldrng mcasures
for secuntv and cooperatlon in the naval
actrvrtres of thc Black Sea countrres"
69. In thrs contcxt some unccrtamtv strll
surrounds Lkrarne's posrtion regardrng NATO
enlargemcnt It u-ould seem that Ukraine rs not
seekrng full membership at the moment and
Mr Horbulin explarned Ukrainc's posrtion as
follou's:
"Ukraine's relatronshrp urth NATO has
rcachcd a qualrtatrvelv nelv level, one of
"profound and cxtended" collaboratron
Ukrarne's vrsion of security risks,
cvaluatron of therr nature, and somc other
points are srmrlar to NATO's to a great
cxtcnt. At the samc tlme. x'c beheve that
gradual evolutionan' enlargement of the
Alhancc should be parallel to thc
dcl'clopment and cxtensron of tres betrveen
NATO and Ukramc on thc basrs of special
partnershrp prrncrples. Such partncrshrp
relations u'ould embellrsh the errstrng
forms of coopcratron in the frameu'ork of
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NACC and the Partnership for Peace.
These rnstrtutrons, ln our oplruon, can
become rmportant elemcnts of European
sccunt\' "
70. In ordcr to undcrstand Ukrame's positron
on NATO enlargement and its proposal to creatc
a nuclear-free zone rn central and eastern Europe,
one has to take into account rts very drfficult
geographrc posltlon betrveen Russia and the
central European countnes. partrcularly Poland,
rvhrch are constantlr' pressing for admrttance as
full members of NATO. Ukraine is no longer
opposed to NATO enlargement but fears that if it
meant that nuclear \\'eapons u'ere deploved in the
neu' member countries, for instance in Poland,
Russran pressure on I-Ikrame, rvhich has rvholly
renounced rts nuclear capabilitl,, rvould be
consrderablv stcpped up Hou'cver. during
President Kuchma's last visit to Poland, his
Pohsh interlocutors clcarll, relected the idca of a
nuclcar-free zonc. an rdca that rs, rncrdentally,
also supported bv Belarus. Thrs puts Ukraine in
a ver)' drfficult posltlon u'hen it comcs to
explamrng rts policv rn thrs area becausc rn rts
rclations lvith Moscou'. Ll<rarnc takes a rvholly
drfferent hne from that of Presidcnt Lukashenko
of Belarus u'ho has alreadl' declared that if
nuclear \\'eapons \\'ere deploved in central
European countnes that had jorned NATO,
Mrnsk mrght ask Moscou' to redeplol, nuclear
warheads and carriers rn Belarus. Ukraine is at
the moment totalll' opposed to such an approach.
7l . In his address to the Unrted States
Congress. Mr Horbulin stated the follorving:
"The geopolrtrcal posrtron of Ukraine
requlres reasonable. consrstent. and
balanced relatrons rvrth both the Wcst and
thc East m cconomic and politrcal matters.
In thrs context, relatrons betrvccn Ukraine
and Russia arc of partrcular importance,
u'hrch \\'e consrder thc most sensitrve
component of our natronal mterests. One
prioritl' ts to advancc our bilatcral
relationshrp to a stable, good-neighbourly
partnershrp. and to agree finally on the
drvrsion of the Black Sea fleet. rvith fixed
conditions and terms for basing the Russran
part of the fleet on the terrrtory of Ukraine."
72. When vour Rapporteur met Mr Horbulin,
the latter explained that Lkrarne was not a party
to the Treatv of Tashkent and had no intention of
partrcrpatmg ln anv sort of mrlrtary mtegratron
u'rthin the Commonu'ealth of Independent States
(CIS). Hou'evcr, rn hrs talks u'ith members of the
Forergn Affarrs and Defencc Committees. \rour
Rapporteur hcard drfferent explanatrons and
viervs rcgardrng the mterpretatlon of Ukraino's
relatronshrp w'rth the CIS. Some members said
that although Lkraine \\'as a foundcr member, it
did not partrcrpate m most of rts activrtres. Others
said rt u'as onlv an assoclate member and some
defended the vierv that Lkrame rvas not a
member of the CIS at all smce it had not signed
its statutes.
73. It u'as most interesting to be told b1'
parliamentarrans that the Ukrainian Supreme
Rada is divrded over the questron of what
dircctron lJkrarne's forergn and security policy
should take Accordrng to them. onc thrrd of its
members are ln favour of seekrng NATO
mcmbershrp. one third advocate stronger
intcgration rvrth the structures of the CIS,
rncludrng mrlrtary cooperatlon m the framcwork
of the Tashkent Trcatr'. and onc thrrd rvould opt
for mtegratron u ith European structurcs lvhile
mamtaming a non-ahgned status So whilc lt rs
obvrous that the maloritv of parliamentarrans arc
clearly in favour of u'estern mtegration overall,
there are several nuances u'hich make it difficult
for the Lkrarnian Government to adopt a clearcut
polic1,. One parliamentarian summed up the
situation b1' say'ing that Lkraine was clearly
moving totvards Europe desprte the fact that
Ukrainians \\'ere not rvhollv European because
they also had some Asian characteristrcs.
74. Nevertheless, 1'our Rapporteur had the
clear rmpressron that there rs no rndication at
present of anv rrsk to the rnternal cohesron of the
country What rs rmportant is that the prcscnt
Governmcnt led b1' Presrdent Kuchma 
- 
rvho like
many of hrs gor,'ernmcntal team comes from thc
castern (Russran-spcakrng) part of Ukrainc 
-
follorvs a clcarcut pohc-v of maintamrng indc-
pendence m respect of Russia
7 5 . As rcgards Lkrarne's relations lvith
Russra. 1,our Rapporteur n,as able to gather some
rmportant supplementarl' rnformatron. Many
polrticians are x'orried about the state of health
of the Russian President as they' would prefer to
settle all outstandrng differences u'ith him rather
than u'rth an1' of hrs potential successors. It was
not until after vour Rapporteur's visrt that, at thc
end of October. the Russian State Duma gave a
t7
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clear rvarning that Russta u'ould never cede
control of Sevastopol. the Black Sea fleet's
Cnmean port. and passed a draft law u'hrch
sceks to prevent the drvrsron of thc fleet5.
Nevertheless, although rt would appear that the
problems of the status of Sevastopol and the
drvrsron of the Black Sea fleet are about to be
settled follorvrng President Kuchma's visit to see
President Yeltsrn rn Moscorv, Ukraine's depen-
dence on Russra for petroleum and natural gas
supplies plal's a malor role in brlateral relations
betrveen the trvo countries. In contrast, Russta
depends to a large extent on the rvell-developed
Ukrainran space industry. Milrtary transtt
through Transdniester does not seem to be a
maJor problem but Ukraine's relations xrth
Romarua are still drffrcult
76 Ukraine is readv to ratr$ the Open Skres
Treatl' but manv of )-our Rapporteur's
mtcrlocutors exprcsscd disappointment that the
Cooperatron Trcaty' betu'een Ukramc and the
European Union has so far been ratrfied onll' b1'
very feu'European countnes A number ofthem
therefore proposed to settle Ukraine's relationshrp
rvith WEU scparateh' from its relatronshtp rvrth
the European Unton
77 Your Rapporteur's strong impression after
hrs visrt u'as that the polrtical debate withrn
Ukraine has norv reached a critical stage m which
the pro-u'estern forces are makmg every effort to
take a decisive lead over those political forces m
the countn'u'hrch strll rvant to restore the former
communrst order. Manv Ukrarnran politicians
expressed drsapporntment about Europe's
reluctance to help the leading force in Ukraine
move closer to European structures and thel'
have conccntrated therr efforts on obtaining the
support of thc Unrted States. Europc, and m
partrcular WEU, rs no\\' faccd urth the great
responsibrlrtl' of decrdrng horv to respond to
Ukrarne's ambrtrons and concerns.
3. Turkey, the Caucasus and
the central Asian region
78 Your Rapporteur's vrsrt to Turkel' enabled
him to make a first assessment of an important
number of further elements which have to be
taken mto account in describing the eastern
dimension of Europe security. Agam, one of
them rs hnked to the questron of enlargement as tt
rs clear that Turkey' mrght bc.prompted to use lts
posrtron rn NATO to press rts allied partners to
agree on maJor lmprovcments tn Turkcr"s prescnt
status. namelv rn tts rclattons u'rth Western
European Unton. Even rf thc officral Turkish
posrtron rcgardrng NATO cnlargement mrght be
described as posrttve but prudent. some pcople
are u'onderrng rn,hether there is any' value in
Turkel' extending its defence obligations rvithrn
NATO to a gn'en number of central European
countnes rvhrch- for therr part. lvould not be able
to contribute in a significatrve manner to the
enhancement of Turkev's securttv. Furthermore,
it is berng suggested in those quarters that there
is no reason for Turkev to support ruth
enthusiasm the integratton of central European
countrres rn the European Union and Western
European Union. rf Turkcy ls glven no chance to
lmprove its oun status m these organtsattons In
addrtion. there arc strll mtnonty' problcms
pendrng betu'een Turkel' and Bulgarra
79 Turker''s unlque posrtion is also evtdcnt
from a number of other outstandmg tssues u'hich
reveal drfferrng mterests betu'een thc Wcst and
Russra. Among these, the explortatron of Caspran
orl and natural gas has alreadv mvolved thc orl
industnes of the Unrted Statcs. the Unrted
Kingdom and other $'estern countries to such an
extent that in June 1995 some commentators
predicted the possrbrlitl' of a "cold $'ar" over otl
and natural gas ln the Caucasus6. Apart from the
Unrted States and Russra, Turkey and Iran are
also heavilv mvolved Under a contract betu'een
Azerbarjan and a ma.;or u'estern otl slndicate,
Caspran petroleum transrts l'ta two ptpelines, one
runnlng through Russran territory and the othcr
through Georgra But thc rssue has not vet bcen
settled srnce rt rs hnked to the question of
drfferent rnterpretatrons of the status of thc
Caspran Sea Moscou'(and possrblv Iran) dcfend
the posrtron that thc Caspran Sea ts an mland sca
urth the consequcnce that all lrttoral statcs s'ould
have a say, in the explortation of its natural
resources Conversell', AzerbaSan defends the
posrtron that the Caspran Sea rs an internatronal
sea and that every littoral state can take rts oun
decrsron on orl exploitation m rts part of the sea.
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80. Furthermore, three countries 
- 
Turkev.
Russia and Iran 
- 
are in competitron as to u'hich
has most mfluence in the central Asran regron
The summit organised last vear in Brshbek, the
caprtal of Krrghizstan, bl' the Turkish-speaking
republics of Azerbagan, Kirghrzstan.
Kazakhstan, Turkmenrstan and Uzbekrstan
caused irritatron in Moscou' even though it u'as
denred that the questron of enhancrng politrcal
cooperation betrveen those countnes and Turkey
had been drscussed at the conference. Horvever, it
rs not onlt,for economrc reasons but also because
of the contrnumg regional and ethnrc conflicts in
the Caucasian and central Asian regrons that anl'
Turkish inrtiatrve to enhancc its influence in the
area is regarded u,ith susprcron
8l Regarding the settlcment of the vanous
ethmc conflicts in the Caucasran rcgron, thc
Turkish interlocutor rvith whom vour Rapporteur
spokc provided a generalll'posrtrve assessment of
the efforts made by the OSCE in all thc cases rn
rvhich the member countries involved \\.ere
prepared to have recourse to rt. In thrs connectron
it is u'orth notmg the assessment of a Russian
member of the Moscotv-based human rights
organrsation "Memorial" uho stated. at a recent
conferencc m Prague. that the refusal of u'estern
countries to partlclpate in peacekeeping
operations on the ternton' of the Commonrvealth
of Independent States gavc the Russian arm)' a
monopoll' for milrtary rnterventronT.
82. Even though most of the Turkish
Government's representatrves tdentrfied first and
foremost the danger of Kurdish terrorrsm
supported bv countries such as Svria, Iraq and
Iran as a major threat to the secuntv of Turker,.
thel' did not minimise their conccrn about the
security implications for Turkcy, of Russian
policy in general and particularll' rn the
Caucasian region. In this connection. Turkct' rs
above all worried by the West's concessrons to
Russia regarding its flank obligations under the
CFE Treaty.
V The state of discussions regarding the central
European countriest requests to join the
European and tran satlantic security structures
83 The enlargement debate \\'as given new
impetus on 16 October 1996, when Lrthuania's
President. Algrrdas Brazauskas, reaffirmed to
NATO ambassadors hrs country,'s desrrc to lorn
the Atlantrc Alliance in the first u'avc of rts
enlargement. Furthermore, the Forergn Mrnrstcr
of Slovakia, u'hich is norv rarelv includcd rn
reforences to the Vrsegrad countries that are
supposed to be thc first to loin NATO, has agam
sard that Slovakia desenes to be in the first rvavc
of ncvv NATO memberss
84. Your Rapportcur ls onl1, too u'ell au,are
that consrderatron of thc three Baltrc countnes
poses a partrcularlv drfficult problem in this
context and he \\'as strengthened in this
convrction as a result of thc comprehensrve talks
he had xrth the Latvian authorrties at the
begrnning of September 1996. Horvcver. in line
*ith the WEU Councrl's dccrsron to grant the
status of associate partner to the Baltrc states
together rvith srx central Europcan countnes in
Mav 1994 and to Slovenia in June 1996. he
rntends to discuss the problcms of all the
associate partners as a rvhole rvrthout. for all
that, neglectrng the specificrtv of each rndivrdual
cas9.
85. There is no doubt that the steadfast
determrnatron of all the neu' democratrc central
European countrres from the Baltrc Sea to thc
Black Sea to Joln \\'estern European and
transatlantrc secuntv mstitutrons as soon as
possible contrnues to bc a central preoccupation
of therr govenments. parhaments and public
opinion Thc fact that in somc of them, i e.
Poland, Slovakra. Hungan', Romania and
Bulgarra, the former communist partres have
reappeared as the mam politrcal playcrs. does not
affect that determmatron. Consequentlr', thrs
strong desrre also remalns toprcal in the marn
x'estern capitals as it does rn Moscorv and a
number of other capitals of the Commonu'ealth
oflndependent States.
1. European Union enlargement
86. As has already been said. the rclevant
u'estern organisatrons and governments have so
far been unable to agree on a comprehensrve
approach to respond satrsfactorily to the request
of the central European apphcants. As far the
European Unron rs conccrned, the European
Councrl agreed rn Copcnhagen rn June 1993 "that
the associated countrrcs m central and eastern
7 \'eue Zurcher Zettung,6 February 1996
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Europe that so desrre shall become mcmbers of thc
European Union".
87. Since then "Europc Agreements" have been
concluded b1,the European Uruon mth the Czech
Repubhc, Slovakia. Poland. Hungan. Romama.
Bulgana. the thrce Baltrc statcs and Sloverua. But
the European Uruon rs not onll' faccd rrrth a
problem of enlargemcnt tou'ards central Europe but
also touards thc south lt should be remembered
that C1prus and Malta have applied for
mcmbershrp and that Turkev m particular has been
on the x'artmg hst for a very long tune. Apart from
mtcmal drfferenccs u'rthm the European Uruon as to
uhether to grvc pnontr'to central Europe or to the
south. rt rs obuous that the Uruon uill have to
lmpose stnngent condtttons as to proof of
commrtmcnt to a market economv and to democracl'
bcfore anl'nc\\. members can be adrruucd Among
other thrngs tlls *rll mvolve radrcal reforms of
agncultural and regronal aid spendrng In the Uruon
rtself, rmportant urstrtutional reforms 
- 
rn parhcular
rn the decrsion-makrng proccss 
- 
xrll be neccssan'.
and a long transtttonal pcnod urll probably' be
requircd before the first ccntral European couttn'
.lours the Europcan Uruon as a full mcmber Nobody'
expects tius to come about beforc 2000 at the
earhest
88 Hou.ever. therc arc further serious problems
regardrng thc cntena accordrng to u'hrch the
European Uruon should proceed wrth enlargement
Somc countncs. follourng the lead of Germany's
Chancellor Kohl. are argumg ur favour of bcgurrung
enlargcmcnt u-rth a hmrted number of countnes. and
thc Chancellor has even named Poland. the Czcch
Repubhc and Hturgary. suggesttng that thcl' should
lorn the Uruon first.
89. This proposal demonstrates the fundamental
rmportance of decrdmg lvhether to (a)tackle the
enlargement proccss on a case-b\'-casc basrs.
studyng cach applicalon on tts o\\n ments
(b/ choose the method of constdcnng groups of
rnterested countries or (c) adrnt all applicants
accordrng to a gcneral clause
90 It seems that the last option is favoured bv
Francc In fact. at the end of February the Elvsce
lard doun general gurdelines for France to follou'
during the negotrations at the intergovernmental
conferencee Thc Elvsee paper stresses that.
"Thc marn purpose of thc urtergovcmmcntal
conference ts to prepare the Europcan Uruon
for rts future enlargcment and to adapt the
exrstrng instttuttons to accommodate that
objective. Thc treattes should therefore
rnclude a gencral clause enablurg those states
that have the neccssan'urll and capabilitl', to
strengthcn coopcratlon srth one another. To
aclueve that cnd. it ought to bc possrble for
some statcs to be able to submrt to the
Councrl coopcratlon prolects r,lhich, oncc
approvcd b1' that bodl'. uould be consrdered
to havc bcen endorsed bf' the European
Uruon If these proposals uere adopted as a
package. the rcsult u'ould be a strongcr
Europcan Uruon able to cope rnth its futurc
enlargement rvtthout horvever rveakemng its
cohcsion"
91. The rmportancc of choosurg an appropnatc
strategy for the enlargement process to be follori'cd
by thc European Uruon cannot be constdercd rn
rsolatron from the secuntl'drmenston. t e tts relatton
urth the cxpansion of NATO and Westem
European Uruon Thcrc are gro\\mg arguments for
gl\mg pnority' to the enlargcmcnt of the European
Uruon srrce tlus rvould not give nse to anl'
oblectrons from Russn and u'ould at the same trme
consrderablv enhancc the stabrlrty' and secunty' of
the central Europcan countnes adrrutted.
92 Thrs rdea has found expresslon in a joint
rcqucst made b1'the German and Darush Foreign
Mrmsters. accordrng to rvhrch the Baltic states 
-
LaWia, Lrthuama and Estorua 
- 
should loin the
European Uruon as soon as possiblelo
93 A sumlar request rr-as made at a recent
conferencc held bv the Nordrc Councrl m
Copenhagen and attendcd bv the hcads of
goverffnent of Frrland, Sueden. Denmark, Nonray
and Iceland. In an arilcle pubhshed m
The European". Mr Pctcrsen. the Danrsh Foreign
Mruster, underhncd that cnlargcment of the
European Uruon eastu'ard xas at the top of the
European agenda and that thc most rmportant task
of the rntergovernmental conference was to pave
the uar for that erpansion
94 In a letter datcd I I March 1996 to
Srr Dudlcl' Smrth. Prcsrdcnt of the Assemblv, our
F rankfurter --lllgemetne Zertung. 12 March 1996
The [iuropean. 15-21 February' 1996.
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Nonvegian colleague. Ingvald Godal, underhncd
the lmportance of mcorporatmg ccntral European
countries. rncluding the Baltrc Repubhcs. rn
u'estem structures. Among other thrngs. he
proposed that rvork should start on a
comprehensive strategv to stabilise thrs regron
that u,ould include aspects such as a plan for
admrtting the Baltrc Repubhcs mto u'estcrn
structures. for instance bv brrnging them into the
European Union first.
95. In a further letter dated 30 April 1996,
Mr Godal rnformed thc Presrdential Commrttee
of his partrcratron rn thc first jornt meetrng of the
Baltic Assembll' and the Nordic Councrl for the
purposes of a seminar on securitl, problcms of
the Baltrc Sea rcgion. He summarised the
conclusions of thrs scminar as follou's:
" l. The Nordrc/Baltrc rcglon is toda,v
Europe's untidy corner as far as sccuntv rs
concerned. rvith an extremely confuscd
mosaic of membershrp rn the relevant
Europcan structures (EU, WEU and
NATO) and a lack of sohdaritv m trmes of
trouble, which is rn sharp contradrctron to
the othenrrse u'ell-developed cooperatron
betw'ccn these eight countries The arm
should be to rectifl' thrs b1' graduallv
makrng all of thcm full members of the
rclcvant European structures.
2 The stratcgv to reach this goal could
be as follorvs
Denmark bccomcs a full member of
WEU 
- 
this region u'ould then have at
least one full playcr on the securitv
scene rn Europc,
- 
the Baltic states should become full
members of the EU, lvith thc requrred
transitional arrangements, as soon as
possrble. this rvould greatll' enhance
stabrlrty, in an area that at present ls
most exposed to aggrcsslon if
developments in Russia take an
undcsrrable direction:
Su,eden. Finland and the Baltic states
should thcreafter join the relevant
secunt)' structures (WEU and NATO);
there rs a specral challenge for Su'eden
to take responsrbility' for this, being the
largest country'rn the rcgion in such a
ccntral geographrc posrtron."
96 Mr Godal also conveved a rcport on hrs
particrpation in the 9th session of the Baltrc
Assembl.v in Rrga on 5-6 October 1996. thc tcxt
of u'hich is reproduced m an appendrx to thrs
report. Your Rapporteur ts ven, grateful for
Mr Godal's contributrons and intends to comc
back to a number of his consrderatrons rn the
chaptcr dcahng urth possrble concepts for
extendrng stabrlrtv and secuntv eastu'ards.
97 Thc marn problems posed by the
cnlargement of the Uruon are not the
consequences of admrttrng certain countrres
earher than othcrs on the basrs of the pnncrple
that all countrres urth u'hrch Europe Agreements
have been concludcd have a nght to become
members of thc Union One of thc main
difficultres rs the trmetable as a rvholc The
complexity of the adaptatrons that are required
both rn the European Union and rn thc candrdate
countnes before enlargement can take place
u'ould suggest that enlargement of the Europcan
Uruon is unhkely pnor to that of NATO or
Westcrn European Union.
98. In this context rt rs u-orth mentrorung that
both thc European Unron and NATO have lard
dou'n a good numbcr of conditions that all
rntcrcstcd central European countries have to
fulfi be-fore ncgotratrons on their admissron can
start
99. Anothcr malor drfficultf is the krnd of hnk
to be estabhshed bctriccn European Union and
NATO cnlargement Therc secms to be
u rdespread agrccmcnt about the idea that all
European Uruon mcmbers should also bccome
members of NATO. Many people think that
integratron in NATO could be achrcvcd pnor to
European Union membershrp" But rn Julv 1995
u'hen the German Chancellor pard a visrt to
Poland. hrs Polish interlocutors fearcd that hc
uould estabhsh a formal link betrveen Poland's
admrssion to NATO and to the European Unron
In fact. thc Chancellor underlmed that Poland's
accession to NATO and to the European Union
werc lntcrconnected but that this drd not mean
that both should take place at the same time.
12 See for instancc thc Declaratron of 11 Scptember
1995 published rn Berlin bl' thc Gcrman Group of




100 So far, the European Union has never
formallv hnked membershrp of the Unton urth
membership of NATO The four "neutral" or
non-aligned Europcan countrres 
- 
Ireland. Sue-
den. Finland and Austna 
- 
that are fulI members
of the European Uruon arc proof of that The
fundamental questron is u'hcthcr it rs rrght to
recommend a strategv glvlng pnorrtl' to the
enlargement of the Europcan Union This needs
to be studred scrrousll' cvcn though it rvould
obhge the European Uruon radicalll' to
rcconsider the hrtherto envrsaged timetable for tts
enlargemcnt
l0l . But rn an article pubhshcd on
12 Januan 1996 rn the Internafional Herald
T'rubune. Davrd Frscher and Wrlham C Potterr-3
argucd that "the best guarantee of the
indcpendence and terrrtonal integrrtv of the
fledging neu' democracies in the former castern
bloc rs economlc integratron rrrth the Wcst Wrth
thrs in mind. u'estern Europe should spccdrly'
integrate them mto thc Europcan Unron. as has
been done rvrth Austrra. Srvcdcn and Finland.
each of rvhrch appears to fccl sccurc as part of a
European communrtv that has mcreasmglv
corrrmon forergn and defencc pohcres. and none
of rvhich has anv mtcntron of lornrng NATO "
102 Hou.cvcr. rvhat mrght be convenient for a
country such as Su'eden. and rn particular for
Frnland. mrght not bc apphcable to the Baltrc
statcs No'crthclcss. it rs rvorth pointing to rvhat
Andrrs Ozohns from the Latvian Instrtute of
International Affarrs u'ntes rn Chctrllot Poper 20
published b1' the WEU Instrtute for Secuntv
Studres
"Betn€en 1989 and 1991, u'hcn Estonia,
Latraa and Lrthuarua \verc u'agmg thcrr
battle for restored rndependencc. the rdea of
Baltic neutralrtr, \\'as urdespread and
popular Soon after mdependence \\'as
regarred, however, the rdea of neutralrty' lvas
abandoncd in all three natrons as rt u'as
considered rnappropnatc to Baltrc securitv
requrements Formal neutralrtl' u'ould have
mvolved a commrtrnent that the Baltic states
uould ne!€r Jom alliances or allorv forergn
13 Mr Frscher rs a scholar at the Centre for Non-
prohferatron Studres at the Monterel' Instrtute for
Intcrnatronal Studres Mr Potter rs Drrector of that
Centrc and of the Centre for Russran and Eurasian
Studres at the Instrtute.
forces on their temtorl', and rvas not scen as
a satisfactory basis for secunh' ln add:tron.
there was gro\\mg uncerLamt)'. and not lust
ur the Baltrc regron. about rvhat exactly'
neutrahw meant rn an agc x'hen East-West
confrontatron had durumshed so sharply' But
the decidrng factor m rclectrrg neutrah[' u'as
the lustoncal memory' of the evcnts u'luch
had led to the denxse of Baltrc rndependence
rn 1940 
- 
a trme u'hen Estorua, Lahra and
Lrthuann x'ere all pursuing policies of
neutralrtv
In the place of neutralrt\', all three Baltic
states hal'e preferred a strateg)' of counter-
alhance. seekrng mtegratron mto an alliance
or commuruS' of larger states m order to
strengthen therr position in relattons urth
Russlalu".
2. NATO enlargement
103. Wrth rospect to NATO's concept of
enlargement, the relevant studl'. pubhshed rn
September 1995. defines somc important
pnncrples definrng thc kind of link NATO
mtends to estabhsh u'ith the enlargement of the
European Unron and Western European Uruon
One of thc shortcomrngs of this study', however,
is that the questron of rvhrch countnes might be
envrsaged for NATO cnlargement remalns open
srnce rt states clearll'that "each invitation will bc
dccrded on rts o$n merlts, case by' case, ... taking
mto account polrtrcal and security-related
developments rn thc rvhole of Europe" Accordrng
to thc studr'. "it rvill be important not to
foreclose the possrbrlitv of eventual Alhance
membershrp for an)' European state in
accordance u'ith Artrcle 10 of the Washington
Treat\'".
104 That krnd of approach could even include
the Russian Federation. On the other hand. the
studl'emphasrses that "the enlargement of NATO
is a parallel process wrth and uill complement
that of the Europcan Union. Both NATO and the
European Union share common strategrc mterests
as x,ell as a broad approach to stability and
secunt)' cncompassmg polrtrcal, economic, socral
and envrronmental aspects, along rvith the
defence dimension".
l.l. Lrmrts and Opportunrtres
Chatllot Paper 20. page 65.
22
at the Eastern Edge,
DOCUMENT 1542
105. Furthermore, the study emphasrses that "the
Alliance has no a pnon requrement for the
statiomng of Alliance troops on the temtorl, of neu'
members". But rt says th,at "for nerv members. the
peacetrme statiomng of other Alhes' forces on ther
temtory should neither be a condrtron of
memberslup nor foreclosed as an opilon".
106. Regardrng nuclear forces, the study
underlrres that "the coverage prolrded by Article 5
of the Washington Treaty,, includrng its nuclear
component. urll applv to nerv members. There is no
a pnort requrrement for the statiomng of nuclear
\\'eapons on thc temtorl'of nerv members". But the
possibihS' of deployng nuclear weapons on these
temtones rs not precluded.
107 Regardrng thc establishment of obhgations to
be met by potential new member countnes and r,r'hat
thel,should have to do in order to prepare for their
membership, the NATO stufi' lists so manv
conditions to be fulfilled that rt rvould seem drfficult
for any, country to meet all of them rn a rclatrvely
short time. It is interesturg to note tlnt m
January I 996, NATO's Assstant Secretarl,4eneral
for Polrtrcal Affairs, Mr Gebhardt von Moltke,
stresscd rr particular the need for applicants to
contnbute to the financrng of the Atlantic Alhance
and added that NATO rvould also confront Russn
uith all the relevant requests if that countrv
expressed the wrsh to become a full member of the
Alhance (!)'' kr tlls conterl, rt rrught be admissible
to suggest that the numerous condifions set out ln
the NATO studl'are to be seen partly as a means of
preventmg certam countncs from becomrng NATO
members.
108. In an)'event, at the ministenal meeturg of the
North Atlantic Councrl on 5 December 1995, it u'as
decided that in 1996 the enlargement process u'ould
conslst of three elements.
"urth those Partners ufio so wrsh. rve
would pursue, on an rrdr.vrdual basrs,
rntensrve brlateral and multrlateral
consultations, burldurg on the foundation
of the enlargement study and the
prcscntations made during the first phase.
Anv rnterested Partrer would be able to
pursue an rntensified, rndilrdual dralogue
wrth the Alliance.
- 
through further enhancemcnt of the
Partnerslup for Peacc, the Alhance urll
adopt a programme of practical u'ork that
llrll strengthen ties betrveen the Alhance
and all of our Parbrers For some Partners
these actinties will facrlrtate their abrh['
to assume the responsibrlitres of
mcmbershrp, w'tule for others they' wrll
serye to strengthen their long-term
parfirerslup ur the Alliance;
- 
the Alhance u-rll consider what intemal
adaptatrons and other measures are
ncccssar)' to ensurc t}tat enlargement
presen'es thc cffectrveness of the
Alliance. In particular, we must examine
the resource and staffing rmphcations of
enlargement.
These three elements rull constitute the next
phase of the enlargement process rvtuch
NATO began in January 1994 Intensrfied
dralogue wrll work in trvo drrections
lnterested Parhers llrll leam more about thc
specific and practical detarls of Alhance
memberslup, they can rellew their efforts rr
terms of the various precepts and pnncrples
rncluded rrr the enlargement studl'. NATO, n
turn, rvrll leam more about what rrdrndual
Parbrers could or could not contnbute to the
Alhance and could begrn to identify areas for
addrtronal xork Participation rn this next
phase u'ould not rmplv that rrterested
Parh:ers u'ould automaticalll, be rnr,rted to
begm accessron talks wrth NATO.
We have tasked the Council m Pcrmanent
Session, urth the advicc of thc NATO
Mrlrtary Authonties, to dcvclop and
rmplement each element of ths next phase
startrng early rn 1996, takrng mto account the
conclusions of the sfudy and an assessmcnt
of the bnefing process. Thrs phase urll
contmuc through 1996. we uill asscss
progress at our December 1996 Ministerial
and consrder the u'a1'fonvard."
At the end of Januan, 1996. at a meetmg of the 27
countnes that signed the Parftrerslup for Peace (PfP)
programme of enhanced cooperation, NATO
officials unverled plans for urdrr.rdual discussions
*ith potentral neu'memberstu Ths could be seen as
15 Interfax.25 January 1996
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the beginmng of the process of rdentrflrng possrble
neu'members but there ts no prospcct of the process
of NATO enlargement berng a speedv one
3. Western European Union enlargement
109 Wrth rcgard to the posrtron of Western
European Uruon rn the cnlargement process, one
has the strong lmprcsslon that smce the creatton
of assocrate partncrshrp status for the Visegrad
countrres - Romanra. Bulgana and the Baltrc
states - through the Krrchberg Declaratton, the
WEU Councrl constders rt has more or less
accomphshed rts efforts to enhance WEU's
relatrons urth the central European countrles
Thc Assemblv of course rvarmll' uclcomed the
Councrl's decrsron m June 1996 to grant Sloventa
the status of assocrate partner as rvcll. But no
major actron to rmprove the status of assoctate
partnershrp has been taken and netthcr the first
part of the 4lst Annual Report of the Councrl to
the Assembly. nor the Madrrd Declaratton make
an1' further mcntron of the question of WEU's
enlargement to the East
110 Hon'ever. in thc Brrmingham Declaratton
of 7 Ma1' 199611.
"Mrmstcrs undcrlined the importance thev
at[ach to thc contnbution of the associate
parhcrs to WEU activitres Thel'uelcomed
thc report to thc Permanent Council on
mcasures taken to mvolve the assocntc
parftrers more m u'ork on opcrattonal
development. rn parhcular on Afircan
peacekeeprng. exerclse pohcl' and
humarutanan task force operailons The)'
rvelcomed rn partrcular thc agrcement to
extend informatton shanng. and bncfings on
WEU cnsrs-managemcnt proccdurcs. WEU's
role ln pcacekeeprng as ucll as thc
arrangements for bncfing assocrate partners
on WEU space and armaments questtons
Thev rvelcomed the acttvc parttcrpation of
the assocratc partrcrs m discusston of
secuntv and politico-mrlrtarl' rssues urthrn
WEU Mmrstcrs cndorsed the Permanent
Councrl's dccrsron to keep under re'neu' the
possrbrlrtrcs for further enhancrng the
assoclatc partners' mvolvement ln the
ongomg u'ork on the development of the
opcratronal role of WEU."
I I I But rvhat rs lackrng above all elsc ts any
concept as to holv to dcfine WEU's rolc tn the
framervork of the enlargement proccss undcr rvat'
both in the European Uruon and tn NATO The
Brrtish Presrdencv clearh' indrcatcd that rt rvould
focus first and foremost on enhancrng WEU's
operational capabrlrtrcs Hou'evcr. at a first
bnefing of the Prcsidentral Commrttee b1' the
Permancnt Rcpresentatrve of thc Unrted Krngdom
to WEU on 19 Decembcr 1995 in Brussels, the
representatlvc of the Bntrsh Presidencl'
underhned that WEU u'as "untqucll'qualified to
dccpcn cooperatton stth observers, assoclate
partncrs. Russra and Ukraine" but "rvithout
overloadrng thc ne\\. WEU uith excessive
mcmbcrshrp".
ll2 Furthermore. the Brrtrsh Presrdeno' also
strcssed that "there is no questton of anv countn'
securing Article V guarantees b1' the back door".
It is rmportant to ask for clarrficatton of the
mearung of thrs phrase in further contacts u'tth
the Councrl and its Charrmanshrp-rn-Office In
answenng questions put b1' mcmbcrs of the
Presrdential Committcc. thc Unrted Krngdom
Permanent Represcntatrve to WEU announced
that "u'e u'rll explore the scopc to formalise
arrangements to tnvolvc obsen,ers and associates
more fullv rn WEU actrvrttes". Furthermore, he
confirmcd that "u.e u'ere mandated by the Madrid
Mmrstenal Councrl to develop the content of
relatrons urth Russta and Ukraine. The WEU
Instrtutc and the Assembll' have an important
role to plav hcrc"
1t3 Whle tlus u'ould seem to confirm that
WEU's cnlargement to the east is at prescnt not on
thc Council's pnontl'hst, rt is u'orth notmg a speech
given on 9 February 1996 at thc IFRI b1' the
Belgran Mulster for Forcrgn Affarrs. Mr Enk
Dcrycke. On that occasion. rcfomng to Bclgtum's
forthcoming presideno' of WEU rn the sccond half
of 1996. he said
"It is mdccd mv rush that accesslon to the
European Uruon. WEU and NATO proceed
on .ur cqual basis There is certaurlv no
qucstron of mcreasmg the drfferences that
alreadv cxst That rs u'hy'I u,ould rvelcome
thc acccssron b1' Denmark to WEU and bv
Furland, Suedcn. Austna and Ireland to
WEU and NATO But it goes uithout sa)'mg
that u'c full1' respect the soveretgn nght of
chorce of cven' couxtn' as regards tts oun
forergn and secun[- polic1'l7 See Document 1516. l3 Mav 1996
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On the basrs of thrs ratlonale, the states
that formerly'belonged to the Warsau' Pact
cannot become members of WEU until
they' have joined the European Uruon and
NATO ''
I14. When Mr Dehaene, Prime Mrnister of
Belgium, addressed thc Assembll, on 4 June
1996, he said among other thrngs that.
"... we must ln all thrs remember that
Europe rs not a homogenous sccuntv area:
a number of membcr states arc rn NATO,
others are neutral or non-aligned, rvhile the
central and eastern European countries are
looking for a nerv strategrc umbrella to
protcct their security interests. A gradual
homogenisation of the European securitv
area u'ould. in my vieu', make our
cooperation more effective There is no
idcologrcal logic behrnd that statement but
sheer pragmatism."
ll5. Your Rapporteur belicves that a carcful
studl' should be done to ascertain u'hether such
thrnking is justified and m conformity' u'ith the
rolc and function WEU should and could assume
m a pan-European security archrtecturc. In thrs
conncction it should again be repeated that the
modrfied Brussels Trcatl'obliges WEU member
countrres to undcrtake an acttve pohcy' wrth a
vrerv to strengthenrng peace and sccunty and to
promoting the unrtl' and mtegratron of Europe.
The possibilitv afforded b1' Artrcle XI of the
Treaty to invite an1, other country to accede to it
on agreed conditions has to be studied on its oun
merits even rf it is obvrous that this has to bc
done on the basrs of a comprehensrve assessment
ofthe gencral securitv condrtrons m Europe as a
rvhole The questlon of WEU's role and
contributron in the enlargemcnt process rvill
thereforc be an important rtem rn the follourng
section of the report deahng rvith the vanous
scenarios and concepts
W. Possible concepts for extending stability
and security eastwards
I16. Your Rapporteur belicvcs that the
discussion should not exclude an)' kind of
concept and that one should not sh1' au'a1'from
drscussing proposals u'hich mrght be considercd
"unthinkable" by ccrtain members
ll7. It is obvrous that the question of
enlargement currently domrnates all conccptual
considerations of a new European securltv
archrtecturc and most of the other outstandrng
problcms to be discussed are closely hnked to
thrs problcm Among thc varrous questions still
to be settled. the most important is the krnd of
conccptual linkage that should be estabhshed
betu'cen the enlargement of the European Unton
and of NATO and the consequences for a WEU
pohc1, in the mattcr, Your Rapporteur agrees
u'ith Karsten Vorgt. President of the North
Atlantrc Assemblr'. rvhen he sa1's that rvhile
accepting a conceptual linkage betu'een the
enlargement of the trvo organrsatrons, there
should be no parallelism in trmc. According to
hrs assessment. "making NATO enlargement
hostage to the resolutron of agncultural problems
rn the European Union ivould srgnal that NATO
membershrp is not for tomorrorv, nor even for the
daY after"l8
I l8 But the difficulties begin rvhen it comes to
tackhng the questrons of "rvho and w-hen". In
both cases, different ans\\'ers lvill probablv bc
found for the European Unron and for NATO.
Wrth respect to the European Unron, the questron
of "lvho" rvas settled in princrple by the European
Councrl ln June 1993. The European Uruon
could therefore begrn the enlargement process bv
admrttrng the relevant countries individually or in
groups, and a country benefiting from a Europe
Agrcement but not included in thc first x'ave of
enlargement lvould have no reason to fear being
lcft outside definrtrvelv. But thc European Unron
has a malor problem as regards "$'hen". Should
there be a strategv of givrng pnontl, to European
Union enlargemcnt or that of NATO'I According
to the German Forergn Mrnrstcr, rt r,r'ould be in
the intcrest of central Europcan countnes for
accession to the European Union to take
precedence over accession to NATO.
119 In fact, enlargement of the Union is lcss
problcmatrc m the securrtr' field but depends on
so many different factors and condrtrons in
economic, financral, structural and organrsatronal
terms that it is very unlikely to be achrcved prior
to enlargement of the secuntv institutrons such as
NATO or WEU. It does not therefore seem
reahstic to proposc a strategv to glve the







European Unron priority as regards the
enlargement question.
120. Such a conclusion mrght have unfav-
ourable consequences, particularly for the Baltic
states. Their early admrssion to the European
Uruon u'ould in fact consrderably enhance their
stabrlrty and security and even Russta would
have no objections. Whrle rt would be much
easier to proceed more qutckly w'ith NATO
enlargement from a technrcal and organisational
point of vrew, the questton of "who" creates
enonnous problems.
l2l. Early admissron of the Baltic states to
NATO might give nse to a polrtical cnsts with
Russia, not because Russia u'ould really feel
threatened by' such a step, but because it is not
ready to accept that countries u'hrch were part of
the Soviet Union until 1991 should join NATO.
For NATO enlargement, the question of "who
and when" therefore poses fundamental
problems, but the trme has now come to find
acceptable solutrons.
122. As long as NATO remains ambiguous on
the question of "who", any approach to admit
new members ln a senes of \vaves ma1' be
regarded by other countnes as a signal that there
wrll be no second wave of admisston to follow
the first A study'should therefore be done as to
whether an overall arrangement could be found
accommodatmg NATO enlargement for all
mterested central European countries at the same
time, even if thrs might at first sight seem a very
provocative approach.
123. Above all, NATO should do away wrth
ambigurties as to "who" can be admrtted. Your
Rapporteur is convmced that the ten WEU
associate partner countnes should be considered
as potential candidates for joining NATO
124 But such a comprehensive approach would
need some sort of overall agreement betrveen
NATO and Russia on their relatronshrp in the
framework of a ner,l' cooperatlve securitv order in
Europe. Russra has often argued that u'hen the
Sovret Uruon agreed in the Two + Four Treaty
that a reunited Germanl' would be free to join
NATO, the rvestern alhes m turn promised not to
enlarge NATO further to the east Even tf no
such promise by the West is to be found rn the
treaty, it is u'orth reiterating that under Arhcle 5,
paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Frnal Settlement
with respect to Gcrmany, the follolving rvas
agreed:
"Followurg the completion of the urthdrarval
of the Sor.ret armed forces from the temtory
of the present German Democratic Republic
and of Berhn, umts of German armed forces
assrgrred to nulrtary alliance structures m the
same way as those ut the rest of German
temtory may also be stationed ur that part of
Germany, but uithout nuclear \!€apon
camers. Tlus does not apply to conventtonal
\\'eapon s1'stems wfuch may have other
capabrlitres n addrtion to conventional ones
but wluch rn that part of Germany are
equippcd for a conventional role and
designated only for such. Foreign armed
forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers
xill not be statroned in that part of Germany
or deplol'ed there."
125. It is true that the situation of drvided
Germanv cannot be compared with the sttuations
of all the central European countries whtch were
vlctlms of the second world r,l'ar and which
should be r,r'holl1' free to choose their external
securrty arrangements. Nevertheless, it should be
possrble to agree that no nuclear weapons and no
forergn troops belonging to NATO should be
deployed in peacetrme on the territories of any
central European countn' which is to jorn the
Atlantrc Alliance. In that sense the Ukrainran
proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in central
Europe rvould seem to be reasonable. That rvould
not prevent such countries from joining the
integrated milrtary structures of the Alliance. In
order to offer more concessions, there are even
proposals to hmit the admissron of new member
countries to the political part of the Alliance'e.
However, therc are fundamental doubts as to
rvhether such proposals would satisfr the
relevant candrdates for membershrp.
126 At a conference of German and Russian
security' experts held in the Bundesakademie fi.ir
Srcherheitspolitik in Bonn in March 1996, the
Russian experts insisted on
limrtrng NATO enlargement to a ferv
central European countnes;
19. Gerd Schmuckle, Frankfurter Allgemetne




the exclusion of the Baltic states,
south-eastem Europe and Ukraine from
the NATO enlargement process:
a remforcement of the OSCE b1'
creating a permanent executive com-
mittee on security in which Russra. the
United States and thc European Union
rvould be represented.
a specral agreement between NATO
and Russra on their political relations;
a thorough revision of the CFE Treaty
including Frnland, the Baltic states and
Su'eden, and the inclusion of the
secuntv organisation of the Common-
wealth of Independent States rn the
security partnershrp betx'een NATO
and Russia.
127. Furthermore, in the framervork of the
OSCE, the Russians have again proposed the
creation of a security charter rn uhich
"each country rvould providc a document
settrng out its perception of the nsks to lvtuch
it feels exposed and thc means it intends to
use to countcr them. The central European
countnes should s[atc crther that they do not
feel thrcatcned b1' Russia 
- 
rn rvhich case
there uould be no point rr their joimng
NATO 
- 
or else that they do feel threatened
by that countn,. rn u'tuch case it rvould be
clear that any' extension of NATO rvould be
directed agarnst Moscorv. To respond to the
sccunty requrements of the former countries
in the sociahst bloc, the Russians propose the
creation of a neutral zone m the centre of
Europe and "overlapprng guarante€s"
provrded both bl,NATO and thc Tashkent
pact"2o.
I28 In a comprehensive study' on a "Strategic
Partnership x'ith Russra" Lothar Rdhl, a former
undersecretarv of state in thc German defence
ministn', developed thc follouing possible
scenario2l.
"ln ar)' event the OSCE needs to have full
operatronal capabrlrtres rf a true "community
20. Le lt[onde, l5 February' 1996.
2l . Neue Zurcher Zettung, l6 March 1996.
of states" in the secuntv sense ls to develop
from the former CSCE uithrn the meanurg of
the 1994 CSCE Budapest document To
that end, Russia's proposal (u'tuch u'as
supported b1, Germanl, and rqected b1' the
United States) to set up a permanent
executrve commrttce as a plaruring and
steenng bodv could be gven a new lease of
lfe and further developcd. The problem of
the selectron of mcmbcrs could be solved
through "alternating regional round tables"
for anv action that became necessary to deal
urth cnscs alongsrde three other OSCE
members (the "rotatrng presidential trorka" or
altematcs rn the case of r:rdmdual states
hamg dual status), Russra, the Uruted States
and the European Uruon could be permanent
members. It lrould also be possible for the
European Uruon to be permanentll'
rcpresented through its presideno'. urth the
addrtion of the Uruted Krngdom, Francc and
Germany
NATO rvould limrt rts expansron to Poland.
the Czech Republic, Hungarl'and Slovakra
There u'ould be an end to the open-ended
evolutronan' process and the self-selection of
candrdates and to the accompumyng,
rartualh' automatrc, corollary of continued
NATO expanslon resulturg rn a series of
changes pushmg the borders of the area
corered by'thc Alhance eastrvard.
For the thrce Baltrc states. agreement xould
be reached on a special secuntl' zone
includrng Furland and Su'eden as a regional
structurc of the OSCE. The subsequent
accessron of those three countnes, and of
Finland and Su'eden as European Umon
members, to WEU and bevond that to
NATO would remain open but u'ould rr
principle be adnussible. Whrle the NATO
states rvould rn duc course seek to reach an
understanding wrth Russn on tlus sublect,
thel' rvould neither acccpt nor concede that
Russia had a veto. NATO and the European
Uruon lvould respect Russia's sovercign nght
to orgaruse a secuntl' and defence
cornmurutv together with other CIS members
rn the same \\'a)' as thei' are entitled to expect
Russn to recogruse their orm common
sccuntv and defcncc organisatron as
contnbutrng to stabilrtl'rn Europe. The basrs
for thrs rs thc freedom of choice to form
communrtles u,ithrn the meaning of the
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CSCE Hclsrki Frnal Act of 1975. ivhrch
u'as confirmcd first rn November 1990 bv
the then USSR rn the "Charter of Pans for a
nerv Europe" and agarr m Dccembcr 1994 rn
Budapest The CIS ri'ould then be accepted
as a legrtrmate mstmment for rntegration
around Russra provided its rules and
structures \\'ere rn conformrq' lrrth
mtematronal lau and the Helsrnla
pnncrples "
129 In the framex'ork of tlus s@nano, the author
leaves open thc need for the conclusion of a securitl,
pact bets'een NATO and Russn. But he affirms
that
"despitc all the drsadvantages it uould entarl
for the eastem European countries, the best
policv both m terms of u'estem means and of
not overstrctchrng the Urutcd States. u'ould
probably be NATO cxpansron limrtcd to
ccntral European coturtncs srth an offer to
Moscorv to hold gencral sccun[' talks
folloxrng the presrdentral electrons ur thc
Uruted States rn November 1996."
130. These very carefullv thought out
considcrations secm to be balanced and logical
Hou'ever. thel' call for a number of comments
First. tho grve Russn such a degree of co-
determrnatron and nght of sa1'rn the framework of a
porverful executrve organ to be created wrthrn the
OSCE uhle encouragrng a reinforced defence
orgarusatron u'rthm the CIS under Russnn
domnatron. that rt is difficult to understand uht'. rn
such a sccnano. NATO enlargement should be
lmited to Poland. the Czech Repubhc. Hungarl' and
Slovakra. It .rght even be sad that tlus concept rs
more geared to mect Amcncan conccms than thosc
ofthe Russians.
131 It is not eas)' to predrct uhcther the
Amcncans nill nou, agree to the crealon of a
permanent executive commrttec xrth strong po\\'ers
rn the OSCE, wfuch thel' refused some vears ago
On the other hand. rt seems that the hmrtatron of
NATO enlargement to the Vrsegrad countnes is
being proposed in l'rerv of the uncertainS, of the
posltron of the Amencan Congress, u-hich has to
ratrf,'the admrssron of neu' NATO members bv a
hvo-thrrds malonh'.
132 Creatrng a specral secunty zone urcludrng
Frrland. Su'eden and the Baltrc states rn a regional
OSCE structure u'tule postpomng their possible
accesslon to WEU and NATO, dcpcndrng on a
subsequent understandrng berng reached u-rth
Russia, would seem to be very problematrcal.
Beanng in mrnd the strong polrtrcal and mrlrtan tics
Russra marntarrs luth the Federal Republic of
Yugoslaua (Serbia and Montenegro). rt docs not
seem acceptable to leave out countncs such as
Romama and Bulgana.
133 Fu(hermore. recrprocal recogrution of
u'estem secunt)'orgarusatlons (such as NATO and
WELD and secuntv orgarusatrons m the framework
of the Commonu'ealth of Independent States as
contnbutrons to European stabrlrty rrught put
countnes such as Ukrame ur a drfficult position. It
has so far refused to lorr thc secunq, structures of
the CIS and has no plan to join the Atlantic
Aihance. lt is perhaps for that reason that some
analy'sts say countncs such as Romama and
Bulgana rrught become a polrtrcal bndgc to Russia
by formrng a sccunty group urth others not seekrng
NATO memberslup, such as Ukaure
134 Furalll', the shortcomrng of all the
abovcmentioned scenanos is that they, farl to
exuurune q'hat krnd of contnbutron Westem
Europcan Uruon could make m a ne\\' pan-
European secunt)' structure. One should remember
in tlus conterl that the Brussels Treaty of 1948
preceded NATO and that the modified Brussels
Treatl' of 1954 preceded the Trea$' of Rome
crcatrng thc European Communit_v.
135. Westem European Uruon paved the rvay for
the rrtegratron of Germany as a fu1l member of
NATO The protocols on the limrtation of the
armed forces of member countnes on the marrland
of Europe as uell as the crcatron of an Agenq' for
the Control of Armamcnts made a considerable
contnbution to the secunh' of Europe long before
the mam East-West drscussrons on drsarmament
and the control of armaments began
136 Wrth 28 European countnes Irr the WEU
"family". albeit still x.ith &ffering catcgoncs of
status, WEU has as lt $-ere anticipated the future
pattcm of the secunfl' dmensron of the European
Uruon. u'luch nonetheless remams to be completed
by' thc future accessron of Malta, Cyprus and
possrblr, (at a later stage) successor countries of
former Yugoslaua. WEU also anticrpated the
central European dimensron of the European Uruon
rvhen rt decrded to grant the countnes partrcipatrng
rn the formcr WEU Consultation Forum the siatus
of associate parbrcrslup. u'cll before all these
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countries had concluded Europe Agreements urth
the European Union.
137. It is norv necessan, for WEU to consrder
more thoroughll,the critena for a conceptual link
between WEU's enlargement eastrvards and the
enlargement of the European Uruon and NATO.
In thrs context WEU should see its role (as in the
past) as a pioneer pavlng the u'a1' for mcreased
involvement of the associate partners in u'estern
securitv structurcs, givrng substance to relations
lvith Russia and Lrkraine and contributing to the
prolect for a common and comprehensive
secuntl' model for Europe
138. The essentral question norv is rvhether the
goal of a broad congruence of membcrshrp in
NATO, the European Union and WEU should be
follolved as a stnct rule or replaccd by a more
flexrble approach without invalidatrng the idcal
underlying that principle.
139. A strict application of thc conccpt of
congruonce in the membership of NATO. thc
European Uruon and WEU rs not rn hne u'ith
political realrties even now, since the United
States and Canada are leading members rn the
Atlantrc Alhance but u'ill not accede to the
European Union or Western European Union
140. A flcxrblc approach to the question of
congruence m membershrp could therefore be
useful and WEU constrtutes the rdeal institution
for gradualll' ensuring congruence betrveen the
European membershrps of both organisatrons
That means that WEU should hclp to pave the
\\a)' for both NATO and European Uruon
enlargement. Such an approach uill make tt
necessary to reconsider w'hcther WEU's
enlargement concept as lard doun in tts
December 1991 Declaration annexed to the
Maastricht Treaty should be revised
l4l. A first objective to be pursued by' WEU
might be to grant the ten assocrate partncr
countries the status of assocrate members. Thts
would be a further step in preparation for their
full membership of WEU to rvhrch thev expect to
accede as candrdates for membershrp of the
European Uruon \fohrle such a step could be
taken in a relatrvelv short trme, rt would
simultaneouslv requlre acceptance of the
Assemblv's repeated demands that European
members of NATO such as Turkcy, Nonvay and
Iceland, be granted full mcmbcrship of WEU
142. Such a measure u'ould be a first step
tou'ards helping to achreve the arm of more
congruence betrveen NATO. WEU and the
European Uruon bl,grving all European NATO
countnes the possrbrlitv of participatrng rn thc
structures of the European common foreign and
sccuntv pohcv rvrthout berng full members of the
Europcan Unron.
143 Admrssion of the ten WEU associate
partner countncs as assoclate members would
also requrre a number of arrangements with
NATO, in partrcular u'rth rcspect to the CJTF
concept and to secuntv agreemcnts. Thus it
should also be consrdered as a mcasure to
prepare for therr subscquent accession to NATO.
144. The most dehcate problem that u'ould
anse for WEU. houcver, rvould be u'hat to do rf
NATO decided to grant full membcrshrp only'to
a hmited group of central Europcan countnes If
thrs u'ere not a question of pnncrplc but onlv a
matter of procccding rvith NATO enlargement tn
a scnes of rvaves, 1'our Rapporteur consrdcrs rt
acceptable and feasrble that the admissron of
central Europcan countries to WEU. at least as
assocratc members, could preccde entrl' to
NATO
145. Thrngs u'ould become much more difficult
if NATO. for uhatcvcr reason. decrded it rvas not
able to admrt to the Alhance all the countries
rvhrch are at present assocratc partners of WEU.
It rs true that thc sccuntv guarantees laid doun in
Article V of the modrficd Brussels Treaty have
genume value onlv on the basis of NATO's
mrlrtan' capabrlrtres and structures. Thrs rcsults
from a decision the European allics took back in
19-50. It rs one that is still valid and u'hich
nobodl' u'ants to change Holever, m thc same
\\-av as NATO cannot accept a Russtan vcto on
NATO enlargement. the link bet*'een thc sccurrtv
safcguards contained rn Article V of thc modrfied
Brussels Treaty' and Artrcle 5 of the Washington
Treatl, cannot lead to the acceptance of an
American veto u'hrch ma1'limrt Europe's freedom
of decisron regarding the enlargement of
European organrsatrons Broad congruence
betr,r'een NATO and WEU enlargement should
remain the fundamcntal oblectrve. But the
complentv of the cnlargcmcnt problem serves to
demonstrate that thc possrbilitl' of seeking
alternatrve solutions on the basrs of the modified
Brussels Treatl' should not be excluded from thc
outset. It rs therefore very important that the
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WEU Council should devote much more effort to
producrng its oun concept m thrs area than rt has
done so far.
146. In dorng thrs, it rs absolutell' nccessary for
membcr gol'ernments of WEU to abandon therr
prevalent vrex'that the Organrsatron has no more
than a complementary' role to plal, in the
elaboratron of a pan-European security archi-
tecture
147. Mecting in Madrid on 14 November 1995,
the 27 WEU countrres. as they then lverc,
produced a first document on a common concept
for European secuntl'. On the basrs of that
prehminan' general assessment, the WEU
countrres, nou' 28 m number. should drau, up
proposals for specific WEU contnbutrons
desrgncd to settle the securrtl problems of central
and eastern Europe These should dcal rvrth thc
specific problems that cover an area extendmg
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and should
include relations x'ith Russra. Ukrarnc and
Belarus. In hrs introducton' addrcss to thc WEU
mmrstenal meetmg ln Brrmrngham on
7 May' 1996. the German Foreign mmrster made
some proposals rcgardmg the role of WEU rn its
relatrons rvrth Russra and Ukraine
148. Among other thrngs he proposed that
"m mvolvmg Russia rn the European secuntl
arclutccture. WEU should strive. through
specrfic cooperation prolects, to consolidate
Russia's generalll' open position regardmg
the rapprochement ofour central and eastem
European partners to the EU and WEU".
Tlus is an approach n'luch should be explored n
depth rrr the nerv WEU stu{, proposed by' your
Rapporteur. wrth particular regard to cnhancrrg
WEU's ties with rts central European parmcrs
149. The Minrster also sard that
"WEIJ's pnmar)' task ur its relatrons trrth
Ukrarne rs to convince ttus rmportant parftrer
that it is mrstakcn rn rts rmpression that it is
berrg excluded from the process of European
mtegratlon and left in a "greY area" as fal as
secuntv mattcrs are concerned ".
In the neu' of vour Rapporteur, the problem is
much more complex, and Europe is faced with a
drfficult decrsron as to hou' it should respond to
Ukraine's pressmg request to be urtegrated rn
European structures At a first step, thc Assembly
could help to improve relatrons w'rth Ukraure b1'
establishrng a regular parhamentary dralogue uith
rts parlnment, and rmtrng a parlnmentan'
delegatron xith specral guest status to attend its
plenary sessions.
WI. Conclusions
150. Thc eastern drmension of European
sccuntl'has so manv aspects that rt is impossible
to deal u'rth all of them exhaustivelf in this
report Your Rapporteur has concentrated on
highhghtrng the prrncipal problems and after a
general assessment. he has arrived at the mam
conclusions descnbed belorv
l5l. The East-West securitl' debate has norv
reached a standstill for several reasons.
- 
NATO decisions are not expected
before next year but differences
betrvecn thc Alhance and Russia
dominatc all the other aspects
connected rvrth the definitron of a
corrunon pan-European secunty model
and threaten to block any progress on
them.
mternal developments in the Russian
Federatron,
deadlock ln the intergovernmental
conference on the revrslon of the
Maastricht Treatl,;
marginahsatron of WEU's role and its
potential for contributrng to the
stabilisation of secun[' rn central and
eastern Europe.
152. In all the talks he had rvith his
interlocutors rn thc various countries he vrsited,
y'our Rapporteur rvas keenly aware of the verl'
posrtrve mterest there u,as in enhancing relations
u'rth WEU. At the ven' least, there rvas much
enthusrasm for better informatron about the role
of WEU about rvhrch, rn certain countries, very
lrttle rs knoun No srngle country had a negatrve
attrtude tou'ards WEU
153 As the onlv European organisation with
organic hnks both rvrth NATO and the European
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Union, WEU should thereforc take advantage of
its uruque position to give the process of
enhancrng stability and security m central and
eastern Europe fresh impetus and to actn,elv
pioncer reconciliation, as it successfullv drd rn
the case of former enemies in x'estern Europe




Letterfrom Mr Godal, Nonuay, associate member,
to Sir Dudlel,Smith, hesident of the WEUAssembly
Report from the 9th sesston of the Baltc Assembllt, kga, 5-6 October 1996
Dcar Srr Dudler.
It u'as agarn mv pnvrlege to represcnt 1'ou at a Baltrc Asscmbll' sesslon
Thc follourng rs a short presentation of u'hat I consrder to b0 thc mam conclustons that can be draun
from ttus scsslon
I The pnmc pnonq'for the Baltic republics is to obtain secuntl' for thc future through membership of
the EU and NATOAITEU There rs an openl1' expressed fear that the1. agarn may be left rn some krnd of
Russran "sphcrc of influence" dunng the ongorrg negotiations betu'een Russn and the West Remembenng
therr lustorical expenence, I find thrs understandable Tlls fear cannot and should not be met bv verbal
assurances on11', but srth a s1'stemailc and concrete prograrnme for their rntegration rnto thc x'estem
structures. It seems to me that WEU is ri'ell placed to take rmtiatrves in thrs respect (scc m1' report on the
spring session of the Baltrc Assemblr)
2. The marn theme of the scssron was "Mutual rntcgration of the Baltic states rn the contcxt of the
Europcan Union". At a confcrence m Copenhagcn rccentll,, the US Defence Secretarl'. Mr Pcrry', made it
clear that the Baltic states urll not be rncluded in thc first group that srll be adnutted to NATO Consequently
thev are nox' focusmg on earlv EU membcrslup Thev realise that to a ven' large extent tlus depends on
themsclves and therr orrn abilrtl'to prepare themselves for such membershrp I find ttus attttude, uhich was
strcssed b1' manl' of the speakers. quite encouraging. It seems that thev arc no\\' really- gettrng doun to ther
homorork Marn pornts stressed dunng the sessron rrcrc
a corrrmon labour market for the Baltic states.
corr-mon bordcr and customs policl'. It was strongll' cmphasrsed that especralll' Latvia and
Lrthuanra must rmprove the control of their eastern borders:
all border problcms must be settled soon (betu'een themselves and rvith Russra):
the economl'must be strengthcncd ("strong econom)' : secunt)'"): a Latvran mrnrster proudly'
declared that his countn' rs now prcscntmg rts first budget u,ithout a deficrt.
increased defence spendrng.
improve relations u'ith Russra ("Russra u'ill remain a superpox'er").
The Balts defirutel1'u'ant to be rn the first group that rs granted EU membershrp. Thev hope to start
negotratrons as soon as possible (earlv rr 1998 lvas mentroned) and thel' hope to.;orn rn 2001.
The Baltrc states are also keen to develop their relahons urth WEU I presume that the leaders of the
Baltrc Assembll,urll be invited to our sessions in Pans rn December and June. I rnformed them about
currcnt cvcnts rn WEU and encouraged them to be actrve u'rthm WEU and NATO (PfP) so as to
prepare themselves for further mtegratron.
Smcerelv yours,
Ingvald GODAL
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